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THE POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTING 
CORPORATIONS FOR CLIMATE CRIMES 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 




In its most recent “Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation” 
(issued in September 2016),
1
the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”) declared that it would
give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute
2
crimes 
that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the de-
struction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural re-
sources, or the illegal dispossession of land.
3
The policy paper, which has yet to be practically implemented, was is-
sued in conjunction with the conviction in the Al Mahdi case,4 in which Mr. 
Al Mahdi was prosecuted solely for the war crime of attacking historic and 
religious buildings in Timbuktu.
5
Though not facially related to environ-
mental crimes, the Al Madhi case may be seen as demonstrating the OTP’s 
willingness to prosecute crimes which were not committed directly against 
people, but still have a powerful effect on them.
6
Therefore, this case may 
* Ph.D. candidate, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to express my 
sincere gratitude and great appreciation to Professor Yuval Shany and Professor David 
Hunter, my research supervisors, for their incredibly valuable guidance. I would also like to 
thank Lindsay Bernsen Wardlaw and the editors at the Michigan Journal of International Law
for their excellent editorial work.
1. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR [“OTP”], POLICY PAPER ON CASE SELECTION AND 
PRIORITISATION, ¶ 41 (2016) [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶¶ 7, 40, 41. The OTP has also noted that it will 
“seek to cooperate and provide assistance to States, upon request, with respect to conduct 
which constitutes a serious crime under national law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources, arms trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, financial crimes, land grabbing or 
the destruction of the environment.”
4. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 
2016).
5. Id. ¶¶ 2, 10. 
6. See also OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 46 (stating that “[t]he Office . . . will 
also pay particular attention to attacks against cultural, religious, historical and other protected 
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serve as another indication of the general direction in which the OTP seeks 
to move with regard to the investigation and prosecution of environmental 
crimes.
In this context, it goes without saying that non-state actors such as mul-
tinational corporations, are frequently implicated in environmental destruc-
tion.
7
Thus, arguably, the goal of investigating and prosecuting environmen-
tal crimes—as set forth by the OTP in its policy paper—would not be 
completely achieved without taking into account environmental harm 
caused by multinational corporations.  Thus, this article explores the possi-
bility of prosecuting multinational corporations for environmental crimes 
before the ICC, and evaluates the applicability of the different core crimes 
listed in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome 
Statute” or “the Statute”) to corporate environmental crimes.
As a test case, this article will focus on the allegedly illegal conduct of 
oil and gas corporations that has been claimed to substantially contribute to 
climate change and to its devastating effects. Today, scientists can trace the 
contributions of individual companies to specific climate impacts, such as 
the increase in global surface temperatures and sea level rise.
8
As a result, 
the causal chain between global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions at-
tributed to a small number of oil and gas corporations, on one hand, and se-
vere climate impacts, on the other hand, is getting clearer. These scientific 
advances are accompanied by the publication of documents and studies sug-
gesting that the oil and gas industry had knowledge of climate change as 
early as sixty years ago, and yet, it has actively promoted climate change 
denial using industry-funded research aimed at increasing public skepticism 
about climate change.
9
There have been several attempts to hold certain oil and gas companies 
accountable for their allegedly illegal conduct at the national level, either 
through lawsuits brought by state Attorneys General in the United States,
10
objects”). The ICC Trial Chamber VIII subsequently convicted Mr. Al Mahdi and sentenced 
him to nine years of imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 63, 
109.
7. See HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (4th ed. 
2011), at 1374–75.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. On October 24, 2018, New York’s Attorney General filed a complaint against Exx-
on Mobil in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The complaint stated that: 
This case seeks redress for a longstanding fraudulent scheme by Exxon, one of the 
world’s largest oil and gas companies, to deceive investors and the investment 
community, including equity research analysts and underwriters of debt securities 
(together, “investors”), concerning the company’s management of the risks posed 
to its business by climate change regulation. Exxon provided false and misleading 
assurances that it is effectively managing the economic risks posed to its business 
by the increasingly stringent policies and regulations that it expects governments to 
adopt to address climate change . . .
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claiming deceitful acts against investors and consumers, or through actions 
mainly brought by U.S. counties and cities, seeking money damages for 
climate change-related losses.
11
Cases of the latter kind are anticipated to 
increase with the growing body of research and documents demonstrating 
the causal link between GHG emissions and specific climate impacts.
12
It may be argued that, in addition to these proceedings, the alleged con-
duct of the fossil fuel corporations should also be of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole due to its widespread and irreversible conse-
quences, which go far beyond national borders and impact communities, 
wildlife, and future generations. Arguably, those who are found responsible 
for these impacts should be held criminally accountable for their conduct in 
the international sphere, as “a reflection of the ‘outraged conscience of the 
Complaint ¶ 1, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 65 Misc. 3d 1233 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2019) 
(No. 452044/2018), 2019 WL 679577165. The case was dismissed on December 10, 2019. In 
its dismissal, the court pointed out that, 
[n]othing in this opinion is intended to absolve ExxonMobil from responsibility for 
contributing to climate change through the emission of greenhouse gases in the 
production of its fossil products. ExxonMobil does not dispute either that its opera-
tions produce greenhouse gases or that greenhouse gases contribute to climate 
change. But ExxonMobil is in business of producing energy, and this is a securities 
fraud case, not a climate change case. 
New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2019 WL 679577165, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. 2019). In October 2019, a complaint was filed against ExxonMobil by the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, claiming that the company “systematically and intentionally, has 
misled Massachusetts investors and consumers about climate change.” Complaint ¶ 1, Massa-
chusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (Super. Ct. Mass. filed Oct. 24, 2019) (No. 19-1333). 
On June 24 2020, the state of Minnesota filed a complaint against the American Petroleum 
Institute, Exxon Mobil Corp and Koch Industries, seeking to hold them 
accountable for deliberately undermining the science of climate change, purpose-
fully downplaying the role that the purchase and consumption of their products 
played in causing climate change and the potentially catastrophic consequences of 
climate change, and for failing to fully inform the consumers and the public of their 
understanding that without swift action, it would be too late to ward off the devasta-
tion. 
Complaint ¶ 8, Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst. et al. (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (No. 62-CV-
20-3837), https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/docs/ExxonKochAPI_
Complaint.pdf. 
11. Cities and counties in California, New York, Colorado, Washington state, and Mar-
yland have filed civil lawsuits against oil and gas companies seeking to hold them responsible 
for the costs of dealing with the consequences of climate change. See David Hasemyer, Fossil 
Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits Stand Today, INSIDE CLIMATE 
NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04042018/climate-change-fossil-
fuel-company-lawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-california-cities-attorney-general; see also
SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, Climate Change Litigation Database,
http://climatecasechart.com. 
12. See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 783 (2009); James 
Salzman & David Hunter, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litiga-
tion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1763 (2007). 
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world.’”
13
Therefore, this article focuses on the possibility of investigating 
and prosecuting fossil fuel companies for the crimes listed in the Rome 
Statute.
This notion poses a twofold challenge: First, it requires an expansion of 
the list of potential perpetrators to include multinational corporations (the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction). Second, it requires recognition of a new pat-
tern of crime as within the jurisdiction of the Court (subject-matter jurisdic-
tion). Both moves should be examined with caution since, as a source of in-
ternational criminal law, the Rome Statute is governed by the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”). Additionally, any effort 
to hold corporations accountable for alleged climate crimes is limited to acts 
committed after the entry into force of the Statute in 2002.
14
This article will proceed as follows: After a brief overview of the latest 
studies regarding the alleged conduct of the oil and gas industry, and its 
contribution to the climate crisis, the article will explore the issue of the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction, i.e., whether criminal responsibility may be 
attributed to legal persons—such as corporations—under the Rome Statute. 
This will be followed by a discussion of subject-matter jurisdiction, in 
which the article will examine whether the alleged conduct of fossil fuel 
companies amounts to one or more of the core crimes defined in the Rome 
Statute. In this context, the article will analyze the elements of different core 
crimes in light of the jurisprudence of relevant criminal tribunals, as well as 
the elements’ drafting history and their object and purpose. This will be fol-
lowed by an examination of different procedural hurdles to prosecuting cli-
mate crimes. Finally, the article will assess whether the Rome Statute’s ex-
isting crimes may and should be interpreted to include environmental 
crimes.
II. Recent Studies and Research with Regard to the 
Oil and Gas Industry
In the past several years, there has been a proliferation of studies per-
taining to fossil fuel companies, which can be classified into two categories: 
The first category of studies demonstrates the causal link between specific 
damages and emissions attributed to major fossil fuel producers (this cate-
gory will be referred to as “causation studies”). The second category focuses 
on the conduct of the oil and gas industry, suggesting that fossil fuel and 
cement companies knew about climate change and its devastating impacts, 
and yet, they did not disclose this information to the public and to their 
shareholders and even engaged in activities aimed at spreading uncertainty 
and skepticism with regard to this issue (this category of studies will be re-
13. PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 113 (2016) (citing ELIHU LAUTERPACHT,
LIFE OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 274 (2010)).
14. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 11, 24; see infra Part V.
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ferred to as “conduct studies and findings”). Both categories of research are 
presented  below.
A.  Causation Studies
In a 2013 study, researcher Richard Heede provided a quantitative anal-
ysis of historic emissions of industrial carbon dioxide and methane from 
1751 through 2010, focusing on fossil fuel producers and cement manufac-
turers.
15
This research identified that a group of ninety corporate investor-
owned and state-owned producers of fossil fuels and cement was responsi-
ble for approximately two-thirds of industrial carbon emissions.
16
This 
groundbreaking study showed for the first time that a relatively small num-
ber of corporations, that have been benefitting from emitting greenhouse 
gases to the atmosphere, made a major contribution to global warming.
17
Subsequently, an analysis released by the Climate Accountability Insti-
tute and Carbon Disclosure Project in June 2017 demonstrated that twenty-
five corporate and state-owned fossil fuel producing entities have accounted 
for 51% of global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since 1988.
18
In a 2017 study,
19
Richard Heede, together with researchers from the 
Union of Concerned Scientists and Oxford University (building on his earli-
er 2013 study), managed to link these historic emissions to specific climate 
impacts. The model-based study quantified the contribution of historical and 
recent emissions traced to ninety major industrial carbon producers 
and the historical rise in global atmospheric CO2, surface temperatures, and 
sea level.
20
15. Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to 
Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 229, 220 (2014).
16. Id. at 234–35. In an update released in October 2019, Professor Heede and the Cli-
mate Accountability Institute published new data showing that from 1965 to 2017, the twenty 
largest fossil fuel companies have emitted 35% of all fossil fuel emissions worldwide. See
CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, Carbon Majors: Update of Top Twenty Companies 
1965–2017 (Oct. 9, 2019), https://climateaccountability.org/pdf/CAI%20PressRelease
%20Top20%20Oct19.pdf.
17. See David Hunter, Making Private Companies Pay Their Share for Climate 
Change: A New Study Could Revive Climate Change Litigation, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM: CPR BLOG (Nov. 26, 2013), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
9571E4DE-EB05-C8DC-9BC39306A6CCED17 (arguing that this study is a potential game 
changer, since it shows that people and private companies are not equally responsible for cli-
mate change).
18. See PAUL GRIFFIN, CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTE, THE CARBON MAJORS 
DATABASE CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 8 (2017), https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4-
c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/002/3
27/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-2017.pdf. 
19. See B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, 
and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATE CHANGE
579, 579 (2017). 
20. Id. The study showed that “emissions traced to these 90 carbon producers contrib-
uted <57% of the observed rise in atmospheric CO2, <42–50% of the rise in global mean sur-
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B. Conduct Studies and Findings
In a study published in 2017,
21
two Harvard University researchers 
made an empirical, document-by-document analysis and comparison of the 
text of 187 communications related to climate change released voluntarily 
by ExxonMobil.
22
They examined whether these communications sent con-
sistent messages about the state of climate science and its implications.
23
They concluded that “[a]vailable documents show a discrepancy between 
what ExxonMobil’s scientists and executives discussed about climate 
change privately and in academic circles and what it presented to the gen-
eral public.”
24
The study found that in private, the company “broadly 
acknowledged that anthropogenic global warming (“AGW”) is real, human-
caused, serious, and solvable, while identifying reasonable uncertainties that 
most climate scientists readily acknowledged at that time.”
25
However, “[i]n 
contrast, ExxonMobil’s advertorials in the NYT overwhelmingly empha-
sized only the uncertainties, promoting a narrative inconsistent with the 
views of most climate scientists, including ExxonMobil’s own.”
26
The study 
concluded that, “In light of these findings, . . . ExxonMobil’s AGW com-
munications were misleading,” but the researchers could not judge “whether 
they violated any laws.”
27
Additionally, a comprehensive report by the Center for International 
Environmental Law (“CIEL”), published in November 2017, presented a 
synthesis of the available evidence “on what the oil industry knew about 
climate science, when they knew it, and what they did with the infor-
mation.”
28
This report found that “[t]he oil industry was expressly warned of 
the potential severity of climate risks by its own consulting scientists in 
1968 and repeatedly thereafter,” and that “[n]umerous industry documents 
demonstrate these risks were communicated by industry scientists to execu-
tives at the highest levels of the industry over the ensuing decades.”
29
The 
face temperature (GMST), and <26–32% of global sea level (GSL) rise over the historical pe-
riod and <43% (atmospheric CO2), <29–35% (GMST), and <11–14% (GSL) since 1980.” Id.
21. Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change 
Communications (1977–2014), 2017 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2017).
22. These documents were released by ExxonMobil itself, wishing to demonstrate that 
allegations against it were baseless. The company challenged the public to “read all of these 
documents and make up your own mind.” Id. at 1–2.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 15.
28. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES: THE LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR HOLDING 
BIG OIL ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS 36 (2017), https://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Smoke-Fumes.pdf [hereinafter CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT]. 
Appendix II of the report describes the different sources on which the report builds.
29. Id. at 24.
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report also suggested that “industry research into air pollution issues was 
highly coordinated and shared widely within the industry, and included re-
search into fossil carbon in the atmosphere by no later than 1958.”
30
How-
ever, despite this, “[i]ndustry records and other sources indicate that this co-
ordinated industry research program was used to mobilize public opposition 
to the regulation of air pollutants by sowing doubt regarding air pollution 
science.”
31
The report demonstrated that “[i]n late 1946, executives from the major 
petroleum companies . . .  established the ‘Committee on Smoke and Fumes 
of the Western Oil and Gas Association’ to fund research into the causes of 
air pollution in Southern California.”
32
The report further noted that:
Industry records, oral histories from persons involved, and analyses 
of its activities by independent researchers strongly indicate that the 
core mission of the Smoke and Fumes Committee was to combine 
industry-funded research and public relations advocacy in order to 
increase public skepticism about air pollution science, with the ex-
press purpose of influencing legislation and regulation on pollution 
issues.
33
The report also showed that “[e]ven while blocking public action to ad-
dress climate change, oil companies took steps to protect their own assets 
from climate risks. This divergence between industry communications to the 
public and industry action to safeguard their own investments began as early 
as the 1970s and is well established by the 1980s.”
34
The report concluded 
that “[n]otwithstanding their own best information, leading oil companies 
and industry associations actively participated in or funded climate misin-
formation efforts for decades through media intended to reach wide audi-
ences of consumers, investors, and the general public.”
35
Whereas the research and studies mentioned above focus on U.S. com-
panies, similar efforts were allegedly made by fossil fuel companies in other 
jurisdictions as well. According to the report,
[e]vidence suggests that European companies such as British Petro-
leum (United Kingdom) and Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands and 
United Kingdom) participated in multiple aspects of US climate 
denial efforts dating back to the original Smoke and Fumes Com-
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id. at 21.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id. at 24.
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mittee, either directly through their US subsidiaries or through 
companies they later acquired.
36
Other publications also suggest that European oil and gas companies have 
lobbied against climate action and clean energy.
37
C. Interim Conclusions
In summary, scientific advances make it possible to quantifiably link 
the contribution of GHG emissions attributed to a relatively small number 
of companies and specific climate impacts. Additionally, a growing body of 
research indicates that fossil fuel companies allegedly led a disinformation 
campaign for decades, while peddling a product they knew with substantial 
certainty would increase temperatures enough to cause the impacts of cli-
mate change.
This article will examine whether the alleged conduct of fossil fuel 
companies may be prosecuted as a crime before the ICC. First, however, the 
article will explore the issue of criminal responsibility of legal persons un-
der the Rome Statute.
III.  Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute
Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall have ju-
risdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.” This language was 
aimed at clarifying, in “an indirect way . . . that the Court does not have ju-
risdiction over corporate bodies.”
38
The controversy pertaining to the inclusion of legal persons within the 
jurisdiction of the Court was described by the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court:
There is a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of includ-
ing criminal responsibility of legal persons in the Statute. Many 
delegations are strongly opposed, whereas some strongly favour its 
inclusion. Others have an open mind. Some delegations hold the 
view that providing for only the civil or administrative responsibil-
36. Id. at 25; see also CIEL, A CRACK IN THE SHELL: NEW DOCUMENTS EXPOSE A 
HIDDEN CLIMATE HISTORY (2018), https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/A-
Crack-in-the-Shell-April-2018.pdf.
37. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 25; see also Arthur Neslen, 
BP Lobbied Against EU Support for Clean Energy to Favour Gas, Documents Reveal,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/20/bp-
lobbied-against-eu-support-clean-energy-favour-gas-documents-reveal; Arthur Neslen, BP 
Tops the List of Firms Obstructing Climate Action in Europe, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/21/bp-tops-the-list-of-firms-obstructing-
climate-action-in-europe.
38. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 564 (2d ed. 
2016) [hereinafter SCHABAS COMMENTARY].
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ity/liability of legal persons could provide a middle ground. This 
avenue, however, has not been thoroughly discussed. Some delega-
tions, who favour the inclusion of legal persons, hold the view that 
this expression should be extended to organizations lacking legal 
status.
39
The final decision to exclude legal persons from the Court’s jurisdiction 
was based on several grounds. When the provision was drafted, the concept 
of corporate liability was not universally recognized, and many states did
not allow for corporate criminal responsibility under their domestic legal 
regimes; thus, it was claimed, the inclusion of such a provision would have 
proved to be a major obstacle with regard to the principle of complementari-
ty (article 17 of the Statute),
40
according to which the states have the prima-
ry responsibility to prosecute international crimes. There were also concerns 
with regard to the ramifications such a move would have on evidentiary is-
sues, and it was claimed that “the inclusion of collective liability would de-
tract from the Court’s jurisdictional focus, which is on individuals.”
41
When 
these issues could not be settled by consensus in the time allotted, the draft-
ers finally chose to explicitly include only natural persons in the language of 
article 25(1).
42
However, twenty years after the drafting of the Rome Statute, a grow-
ing number of legal systems across the globe have recognized the principle 
of corporate criminal liability for atrocity crimes,
43
by adding offenses per-
taining to corporate liability to their criminal codes.44 This development has 
been accompanied by international instruments, such as multinational trea-
ties, aimed at holding corporations accountable through provisions on cor-
porate criminal liability.44F
45
Other developments regarding corporate criminal 
39. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court, Addendum, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, ¶ 49, n.3 (Apr. 14, 
1998).
40. See OTTO TRIFFTERER & KAI AMBOS, A COMMENTARY TO THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 986 (3d ed. 2016) [hereinafter TRIFFTERER 
COMMENTARY]; Caroline Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under Internation-
al Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L. REV. 351, at 353.
41. TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 986.
42. See Brief from David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a 
Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 2011 WL 6813576, at 
14 (U.S., Dec. 20, 2011).
43. Kaeb, supra note 40, at 351–52 (2016); see also Brief from David J. Scheffer as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6.
44. See Kaeb, supra note 40, at 352.
45. Id. at 352 n.5; CEDRIC RYNGAERT & JEAN D’ASPREMONT, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ASSOCIATION WASHINGTON CONFERENCE NON-STATE ACTORS 3RD REPORT 
PREPARED BY THE CO-RAPPORTEURS (2014). Interestingly, many of these treaties are envi-
ronmental ones. 
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liability in the international sphere that may indicate a somewhat similar 
trend are examined below.
A. The STL Contempt Case
In a decision issued in October 2014, the appeals panel of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) held that the term “person” in rule 60 bis of 
the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
46
should be interpreted to in-
clude legal entities, allowing contempt charges to be brought against a cor-
porate entity (New TV S.A.L.).
47
The Tribunal noted “the growing number of states criminalizing the acts 
and conducts of legal persons,”
48
and the “concrete movement on an interna-
tional level backed by the United Nations for, inter alia, corporate account-
ability.”
49
The Tribunal also referred to a recent study commissioned by the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the effec-
tiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms in relation to corporations, which 
concluded that “most jurisdictions appear to recognise the possibility of 
corporate criminal responsibility (if not as a general concept then at least in 
relation to specific offences or types of offences).”
50
The Tribunal further stressed that “[i]nternational law has long since 
recognised the exposure of non-human entities to liability under internation-
al standards,”
51
referring to the enforcement of the international prohibition 
on the slave trade by condemning the vessel involved
52
and to the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg, which authorized 
the designation of “any group or organisation as criminal.”
53
The Tribunal concluded that “given all the developments outlined 
above, corporate criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very 
least, the status of a general principle of law applicable under international 
46. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON [“STL”], Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/legal-documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence (last 
visited June 3, 2020).
47. In the Case Against New TV S.A.L. & Karma Mohamed Tahsin al Khayat, STL-
14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in 
Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 74 (Special Trib. for Leb. Oct. 2, 2014).
48. Id. ¶ 44.
49. Id. ¶ 46 (citing the U.N. Human Rights Council, The U.N. Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Reme-
dy” Framework, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011)).
50. Id. ¶¶ 52, 55. The Tribunal acknowledged that some jurisdictions do not recognize 
this possibility, but stated that “[t]his does not mean that corporate entities in these jurisdic-
tions (which include Germany, Italy and Ukraine) enjoy complete impunity. Instead, corporate 
wrongdoing is dealt with through a system of administrative offences and penalties.” Id. ¶ 49.
51. Id. ¶ 61.
52. Id. ¶ 61.
53. Id. ¶ 63. 
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law”
54
and added that it “simply cannot ignore the reality that many corpora-
tions today wield far more power, influence and reach than any one per-
son.”
55
The tribunal also noted that “the prosecution of natural persons, ra-
ther than the legal persons that they serve, would fail to underline and 
punish corporate cultures that condone and in some cases encourage illegal 
behaviour. Punishing only natural persons in such circumstances would be a 
poor response where the need for accountability lies beyond any one 
person.”
56
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Akoum asserted that “the word ‘person’ 
as contained in Rule 60 bis cannot be interpreted to include legal persons.”57
Hence, he was of the view that New TV S.A.L. could not be charged with 
contempt.
It should be emphasized though, that Judge Akoum “offer[ed] no view 
on whether or not customary international law or general principles of law 
presently recognise corporate criminal liability,” and his approach derived 
from the “fundamental and holy principles of criminal law: nullum crimen 
sine lege scripta (crimes must be based on written provisions), nullum 
crimen sine lege stricta (strict construction of criminal provisions) and in 
dubio pro reo (when in doubt, side for the accused).”58
Though the STL Contempt decision is a significant development in the 
context of international corporate criminal liability, the applicability of this 
decision to the ICC is limited, for three main reasons. First, the context of 
the decision as a contempt decision (which relates to the STL’s Rules of 
Procedure and not to the crimes listed in the STL Statute) makes it less rele-
vant with respect to the prosecution of legal entities for the core crimes 
listed in the Rome Statute. Second, there is a major difference between the 
language of the provisions at issue: Whereas rule 60 bis of the STL Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence uses the word “person,”  article 25(1) of the Rome 
Statute explicitly refers to “natural persons.” This is all the more striking as 
rule 2 of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence defines a “victim” as “a 
natural person;” therefore, there is a strong case that the use of the general 
term “person” in article 60 bis may refer to either a natural person or a legal 
one. Third, the hybrid nature of the Tribunal, which applies domestic Leba-
nese law,
59
also limits the relevance of this decision to the ICC.
60
54. Id. ¶ 67.
55. Id. ¶ 82.
56. Id. ¶ 83. 
57. Id. ¶ 26 (Akoum, J., dissenting).
58. Id. ¶ 2 (Akoum, J., dissenting).
59. According to article 2 to the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the provi-
sions of the Lebanese Criminal Code are applicable to the prosecution and punishment of the 
crimes referred to in article 1. Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2, U.N. Doc 
S/RES/1757 (2007).
60. See GERHARD WERLE & FLORIAN JESSBERGER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 28, ¶ 83 (3d ed. 2014) (noting that “[t]he hybrid courts’ jurisprudence, how-
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B. The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights
In 2014, the African Union adopted a “Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,” 
which adds an international criminal law section to the African Court of Jus-
tice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.
61
Article 46C(1) of the Protocol ex-
plicitly states that “[f]or the purpose of this Statute, the [African] Court shall 
have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States.”
62
The 
Protocol then goes into further detail about corporate intention, attribution, 
and corporate knowledge.
63
Also notable in this context is the list of crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the court, which includes, in addition to “traditional” international crimes 
such as crimes against humanity, the crime of “Trafficking in Hazardous 
Wastes”
64
and the crime of “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources.”
65
It should be noted that the Protocol has not yet entered into force.
66
Ad-
ditionally, while this Protocol undoubtedly represents a trend toward corpo-
rate criminal responsibility in the international sphere, its implications with 
regard to the ICC are limited, due to the lack of an equivalent provision in 
the Rome Statute.
C. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on 
Crimes Against Humanity
In its sixty-eighth session (2016),
67
the Drafting Committee of the Inter-
national Law Commission (“ILC”) provisionally adopted draft articles 5 
through 10 on crimes against humanity.
68
Draft article 5(7) states that 
ever, is in most cases much less relevant for the evolution of international criminal law than 
that of the United Nations ad hoc Tribunals”).
61. African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the Afri-
can Court of Justice and Human Rights (June 27, 2014), https://au.int/sites/default/files/
treaties/36398-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_
the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf.
62. Id. art. 46C(1).
63. For instance, article 46C(2) states that “[c]orporate intention to commit an offence 
may be established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which con-
stituted the offence.” Id. art. 46C(2). According to article 46C(3), “[a] policy may be attribut-
ed to a corporation where it provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that 
corporation.” Id. art. 46C(3). And article 46C(4) states that “[c]orporate knowledge of the 
commission of an offence may be established by proof that the actual or constructive 
knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation.” Id. art. 46C(4). 
64. Id. art. 28A(12).
65. Id. art. 28A(13).
66. Id. art. 11 (“The Protocol and the Statute annexed to it shall enter into force thirty 
(30) days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by fifteen (15) Member States.”) This 
condition has not yet been fulfilled.
67. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/71/10 (2016) (at its 3312th and 3325th meetings, on 9 June and 21 July 2016 respectively).
68. Id. at 246–77.
2020] Prosecuting Climate Crimes at the ICC 503
[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall take 
measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of legal per-
sons for the offences referred to in this draft article. Subject to the 
legal principles of the State, such liability of legal persons may be 
criminal, civil or administrative.
69
By provisionally adopting this draft article, the ILC clarified that pri-
vate corporations may be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. Still, ac-
cording to the ILC itself, the liability of legal persons at the national level 
may take different forms, and not necessarily a criminal one. The ILC em-
phasized that “there is no obligation to establish criminal liability if doing so 
is inconsistent with a State’s national legal principles; in those cases, a form 
of civil or administrative liability may be used as an alternative.”
70
Hence, 
while this is certainly a step forward with regard to international corporate 
liability in general, it has limited implications with regard to corporate crim-
inal liability.
D. Interim Conclusions
In summary, there is indisputably a trend towards the recognition of 
corporate liability. Though this trend is more evident at the national level,
71
the developments described above may indicate a similar movement in the 
international sphere. In any event, it is probably too early to predict whether 
this trend will manifest itself in criminal responsibility or in other forms of 
liability.
Additionally, it should be emphasized that even if corporate criminal li-
ability may be considered a general principle in international law, as the ma-
jority in the STL Contempt decision believed, the explicit language of article 
25(1) constitutes a major hurdle with regard to prosecuting corporations be-
fore the ICC. As opposed to the examples discussed above—the STL Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, the amendments to the Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, and the ILC’s draft arti-
cle on crimes against humanity—the text of article 25(1) to the Rome Stat-
ute explicitly applies only to natural persons. Perhaps, then, the only way 
for the Rome Statute to apply to legal entities is through an amendment to 
the Statute adding a provision dealing with jurisdiction over legal 
69. Id. at 248. The same text was adopted by the ILC in its sixty-ninth session (on May 
26, 2017). Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session: Crimes Against 
Humanity, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.892 (2017).
70. See id. at 262–65 (describing the current state of liability for legal persons in inter-
national law).
71. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
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entities. However, this may prove to be “extremely difficult to achieve dip-
lomatically.”
72
It is important to note, though, that the Rome Statute’s current treatment 
of legal persons does not avoid liability for corporate actions. The Court 
may hold individual perpetrators accountable for the crimes they have 
committed, without allowing a legal entity to shield them. As stated in the 
Nuremberg trials, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”
73
Therefore, re-
gardless of whether legal entities are subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, cor-
porate managers and executives fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
may be prosecuted as “natural persons.”
In this context, it should be noted that both OTP regulation 34(1) and 
the OTP’s 2016 Policy Paper direct the Office to conduct its investigations 
in a way that ensures that charges are brought against “the person or persons 
who appear to be the most responsible.”
74
It is not clear, however, who is 
“the most responsible” in the context of corporate crimes: Is it the corpora-
tion itself, or perhaps the corporate officials allegedly involved in the corpo-
rate actions?
75
As Caroline Kaeb has noted, “attributing liability merely to the individ-
ual managers would not be an accurate reflection of blameworthiness when 
dealing with crimes committed through collective corporate action” and 
“mere individual criminal prosecution would not lead to the organizational 
change necessary at the firm level to reform corporate policies and struc-
tures that have facilitated the commitment of the crimes in the first place.”
76
From this perspective, in order to make the necessary impact at the firm lev-
el, as well as hold the individual accountable, perhaps both the corporation 
and corporate officials should be prosecuted.
In conclusion, it seems that there are substantial hurdles to prosecution 
of corporations under the Rome Statute, as the current language of article 
25(1) does not readily allow such interpretation. This does not mean, of 
course, that corporations cannot be prosecuted at the national level. And, in 
72. David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under the Rome Statute, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J.
37, 38 (2016, Online Symposium) (claiming that states that economically rely on the activity 
of multinational corporations would oppose such efforts).
73. United States et al. v. Goring et al., Judgment, Trial of the Major War Criminals 
Before the International Military Tribunal—Official Documents, at 223 (Nuremberg, 1947).
74. Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009). 
Regulation 34 (1) is also mentioned in the OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1, ¶ 42.
75. It should be noted that “most responsible” may be read as a relative term, that is, 
most responsible among those subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
76. Caroline Kaeb, A New Penalty Structure for Corporate Involvement in Atrocity 
Crimes: About Prosecutors and Monitors, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 20, 21 (2016, online symposi-
um) (also mentioning that “[t]he literature on organizational behavior has established that op-
timal deterrence and retribution can be achieved by targeting both the responsible individual 
and the firm . . .”).
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any event, as mentioned above, corporate officials may be prosecuted as 
“natural persons.”
The article will now consider the applicability of the different Rome 
Statute crimes to the alleged conduct of the fossil fuel companies, focusing 
on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
IV. Can Climate Crimes Be Categorized Within Any of the 
Rome Statute’s Core Crimes?
A. Climate Crimes as War Crimes
As the name of this category of crimes implies, the existence of an 
armed conflict is an essential element for the prosecution of war crimes.
77
Thus, crimes committed in times of peace do not fall within the scope of 
this category of crimes.
78
Accordingly, only environmental crimes that “took 
place in the context of and [were] associated with an . . . armed conflict”
79
may constitute a crime under article 8 of the Rome Statute. Whereas envi-
ronmental destruction is in many cases an integral part of crimes committed 
in the context of an armed conflict,
80
it may be reasonably assumed that cli-
mate crimes are generally not associated with an armed conflict, thus mak-
ing this category of crimes of less relevance to the current discussion.
Still, it should be noted that when article 8 applies, several provisions of 
this article pertain to the destruction of property or damage to the natural 
environment. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) criminalizes the act of “[i]ntentionally 
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall mili-
tary advantage anticipated.”
81
This definition was inspired by the 1977 Pro-
tocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (“Additional Protocol 
I”), articles 35(3) and 55(1).
82
Article I(1) to the Convention on the Prohibi-
77. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 228.
78. Id.
79. International Criminal Court, ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11, Elements of Crimes art. 8, 
(2011) (on war crimes) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
80. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Seven-
ty-First Session: Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, Text and Ti-
tles of the Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Read-
ing, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.937 (Apr. 29–June 7 and July 8–Aug. 9 2019).
81. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
82. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 
40, at 378–79.
506 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:491
tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (the “ENMOD Convention”) uses similar language.
83
Consequently, commentary on those documents may provide insight in-
to the application of article 8(2)(b)(iv). In the context of the ENMOD Con-
vention, the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) interprets 
the term “widespread” as “encompassing an area on the scale of several 
hundred square kilometers;”
84
“long-lasting” shall be interpreted as “lasting 
for a period of months, or approximately a season;”
85
and “severe” shall be 
interpreted as “involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human 
life, natural and economic resources or other assets.”
86
A similar interpreta-
tion was suggested by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(“UNEP”).
87
In contrast, Additional Protocol I’s use of “long-lasting” is 
commonly understood as referring to a period of decades.
88
Climate crimes 
easily satisfy these three requirements since climate impacts are undoubted-
ly widespread, long-term, and severe, even under the stricter interpretation.
Notably, however, neither the Additional Protocol I, nor the ENMOD 
Convention, includes a proportionality test like that in article 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the Rome Statute, requiring the damage to be “clearly excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”
89
In two separate provisions (article 8(2)(b)(ix) for international armed 
conflict, and its mirror provision for non-international armed conflict, article 
8(2)(e)(iv)), article 8 of the Rome Statute also criminalizes the act of 
“[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, ed-
ucation, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals 
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not 
83. See Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Technique art 1.1, Dec. 10 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter 
ENMOD Convention].
84. CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, Practice Relating to Rule 
45, Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule45 (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) (regarding the ENMOD
Convention); TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 378–79; David Hunter, Private 
Sector Liability for Environmental Harm Under International Law, Background Paper Pre-
pared for the International Commission of Jurists’ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Com-
plicity in International Crimes, at 33 (prepared for the International Commission of Jurists’ 
Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes) (on file with author).
85. CUSTOMARY IHL DATABASE, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An 
Inventory and Analysis 5 (Nov. 2009) (stating that “[a]s a starting point in developing these 
definitions, the precedents set by the 1976 ENMOD convention should serve as the minimum 
basis, namely that ‘widespread’ encompasses an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometers; ‘longterm’ is for a period of months, or approximately a season; and ‘severe’ in-
volves serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural economic resources or 
other assets”).
88. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 379.
89. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) n.36.
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military objectives.”
90
Article 8(2)(e)(iv) was at the center of the Al Mahdi
case, which will be discussed next.
1. The Al Mahdi Case
In this case, the defendant, Mr. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, was charged 
with the crime of intentionally directing attacks against nine mausoleums 
and one mosque in Timbuktu, Mali in 2012.
91
He admitted guilt for the war 
crime of attacking protected objects under article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute
92
and was convicted as a co-perpetrator under articles 8(2)(e)(iv) and 
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. Consequently, he was sentenced to nine years 
of imprisonment.
93
In its decision, the ICC’s Trial Chamber VIII traced back the enhanced 
protection of cultural property in international law to articles 27 and 56 of 
the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1919 Commission on Responsibility, and 
the Geneva Conventions.
94
Reflecting the particular importance of interna-
tional cultural heritage, the Court stated that “the element of ‘direct[ing] an 
attack’ encompasses any acts of violence against protected objects and will 
not make a distinction as to whether it was carried out in the conduct of hos-
tilities or after the object had fallen under the control of an armed group.”
95
The Court further stressed that “international humanitarian law protects cul-
tural objects as such from crimes committed both in battle and out of it.”
96
While assessing the gravity of the crime, the Court noted that “even if 
inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than
crimes against persons.”
97
Still, considering the fact that the targeted build-
90. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv).
91. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 10.
92. See Al Mahdi Case: Accused Makes an Admission of Guilt at Trial Opening, INT’L
CRIM. CT. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=pr1236. Interest-
ingly enough, this was the first time in the history of the Court that a defendant has made an 
admission of guilt. 
93. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 109.
94. Id. ¶ 14. The Court also referred to the Additional Protocol I, supra note 82, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 and to the Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, March 26. 1999, 2253 
U.N.T.S. 172.
95. Id. ¶ 15.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶ 77; see also Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG, 
Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 145 (May 23, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04476.pdf (distinguishing between “the 
crimes of murder and attack against a civilian population on the one hand, and the crimes of 
destruction and pillaging, on the other, as the former amount to violence to life whereas the 
latter, although significant, amount to threat to property” and expressing the view that there 
should be a more severe penalty for the former). The Chamber also emphasized that since the 
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ings had not only religious, but also symbolic and emotional value, for the 
inhabitants of Timbuktu, the Court concluded that the crime was “of signifi-
cant gravity.”
98
The Court also took into account the fact that all but one of 
the targeted sites were United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) World Heritage sites and, as such, the attacks 
had particular gravity as their destruction affected not just the inhabitants of 
Timbuktu, but the entire international community.
99
2. Interim Conclusions
In sum, the category of war crimes could be relevant to the prosecution 
of environmental crimes that were committed with connection to an armed 
conflict. Under article 8, environmental crimes may be prosecuted as war 
crimes either alongside other war crimes, or as the sole crime prosecuted, as 
was demonstrated in the Al Mahdi case, where cultural damage alone was 
litigated. Notably, in this case the armed conflict did not play a central role 
in the decision. The Al Mahdi Court explicitly stated that “the [qualifying] 
‘conduct’ is the attack on cultural objects,” and that “what this element re-
quires is not a link to any particular hostilities but only an association with 
the non-international armed conflict more generally,”
100
suggesting that the 
nexus to an armed conflict in article 8 environmental cases could also be 
somewhat flexible. Under the Al Mahdi Court’s logic, the qualifying con-
duct would be environmental destruction, and a general link to an armed 
conflict would be sufficient to create a nexus. Nevertheless, an association 
to an armed conflict cannot be waived altogether, making article 8 an inept 
option for the prosecution of most climate crimes.
Still, the Al Mahdi decision is relevant because it illustrates the signifi-
cance the ICC attributes to crimes that were not committed directly against 
people, but that, nevertheless, have a great effect on them and on the com-
property that was destroyed was essential for the daily lives of the victims, the destruction had 
led to their poverty and forced them to leave their homes. Id.
98. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 82.
99. Id. ¶¶ 78–80. It is interesting to mention that according to an International Union 
for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) report, “climate change is the fastest growing threat 
to natural World Heritage known to affect world heritage sites.” IUCN World Heritage Out-
look 2: A Conservation Assessment of All Natural World Heritage Sites, IUCN (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.worldheritageoutlook.iucn.org/home-page. For a discussion of the potential im-
pacts of climate change on World Heritage sites see also UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, Climate Change and World Heritage: Report on 
Predicting and Managing the Impacts of Climate Change on World Heritage and Strategy to 
Assist States Parties to Implement Appropriate Management Responses (May 2007), 
https://whc.unesco.org/document/8874. See also Jørgen Hollesen et al., Climate Change and 
the Deteriorating Archaeological and Environmental Archives of the Arctic, 92 ANTIQUITY
363, 573–86 (2018); (showing that intensification of permafrost thaw and coastal erosion are 
damaging and destroying a wide range of cultural and environmental archives around the Arc-
tic).
100. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 18.
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mon interest of all humanity.
101
The willingness of the Court to convict Al 
Mahdi under these circumstances may serve as a signal of its potential 
openness towards prosecuting environmental crimes,
102
and it also might be 
used as an interpretive tool with regard to the prosecution of climate crimes 
under other categories of crimes listed in the Rome Statute.
B. Climate Crimes as Crimes Against Humanity
“Crimes against humanity” were first introduced as legally binding in 
1945, when Professor Hersch Lauterpacht proposed the crime for prosecu-
tion before the Nuremberg Tribunal, to address atrocities against civilians. 
However, the term “crimes against humanity” was coined before that and 
was in common use before 1945 “to describe a range of atrocities, including 
slavery and the slave trade, as far back as the eighteenth century, including 
by eminent thinkers like Voltaire and Beccaria.”
103
It was also used in 1915, 
in a non-binding, joint declaration made by the French, British, and Russian 
governments, in the context of mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire.
104
The creation of this category of crimes “indicated that the international 
community was widening the category of acts considered of ‘meta-national’ 
concern. This category came to include all actions running contrary to those 
basic values that are, or should be, considered inherent in any human be-
ing.”
105
It also “affirmed that international law was not only ‘between States’ 
but ‘also the law of mankind.’”
106
Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute in-
clude no requirement for a nexus to an armed conflict.
107
Article 6(c) of the 
101. See also OTP POLICY PAPER, supra note 1, ¶ 46.
102. See also id.
103. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 147.
104. See ANTONIO CASSESE & PAOLA GAETA, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 84 (3d ed. 2013). The declaration stated that: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey 
against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime 
Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman 
Government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” Id.; see also 
SANDS, supra note 13, at 111–13.
105. CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 87.
106. SANDS, supra note 13, at 113. Interestingly enough, it has been said that the term 
“humanity” in “crimes against humanity” was not synonymous with “mankind” or “human 
race,” but rather referred to “the quality of being humane.” CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 
104, at 87. This may indicate that it is not necessary to show that human beings were harmed 
as a result of the act, possibly supporting the recognition of crimes against the environment 
per se (such as harm to nature, harm to animals, and biodiversity loss) as crimes against “hu-
manity.” However, in the case of the alleged climate crimes discussed here, this argument is 
obviously of less relevance since humans are direct victims of climate change.
107. As opposed to war crimes, which derive from international humanitarian law, this 
category of crimes is viewed as an implication of international human rights law. See
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 147; CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 92. 
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Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal has linked crimes against humanity to 
the other two categories of offences, crimes against peace and war crimes,
108
and the Nuremberg Tribunal narrowed the scope of this category of offences 
by excluding crimes against humanity that had been committed before the 
war.
109
However, ‘[i]n the years following World War II, the validity of the 
war nexus was . . . increasingly questioned,”
110
and today international cus-
tomary law prohibits crimes against humanity regardless of whether they 
were committed in times of war or in times of peace.
111
This principle is 
well reflected in the Rome Statute, which does not require that crimes 
against humanity have any connection to an armed conflict,
112
leaving the 
door open to the possibility of classifying climate crimes as crimes against 
humanity.
1. The Contextual Elements of Crimes Against Humanity
The ICC has identified five distinct “contextual elements” of the crimes 
listed in article 7 of the Rome Statute:
113
(i) an attack directed against any 
civilian population; (ii) a state or organizational policy; (iii) an attack of a 
widespread or systematic nature; (iv) a nexus between the individual act and 
the attack; and (v) the perpetrator’s knowledge of the attack. How these el-
ements apply to the alleged climate crimes is explored below.
i. An Attack Directed Against Any Civilian Population
This element reflects the great innovation made by the Nuremberg 
Charter—that individuals could be prosecuted for crimes committed in their 
official capacity against their own citizens.
114
As clarified by the Elements of 
Crimes, for the purposes of article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, an “attack” is 
not restricted to a “military attack,” but rather refers to “a campaign or oper-
108. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 
Stat. 1533, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (“[I]n execution of or connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal[.]”); see CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 86.
109. See CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 87–88. Although this might have been 
due to issues of retroactivity. Id.
110. See Marjolein Cupido, The Policy Underlying Crimes Against Humanity: Practical 
Reflections on a Theoretical Debate, 22 CRIM. L.F. (2011), at 278.
111. Nevertheless, it may be argued that other international instruments narrow the 
scope of the customary rules, such as the Statute of the ICTY, which refers to crimes against 
humanity committed in an armed conflict. See CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 90; 
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Res. 827 art. 5 (May 25, 1993) 
(amended July 7, 2009 by Res. 1877).  
112. CASSESE & GAETA, supra note 104, at 90.
113. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation, ¶ 79 (Mar. 31 2010); see also
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 153.
114. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 154.
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ation carried out against the civilian population.”
115
It should also be noted 
that an “attack” may be non-violent.
116
An “attack” consists of “a course of 
conduct involving the commission of multiple acts referred to in para-
graph 1.”
117
The phrase “course of conduct” has been interpreted by the 
Court to indicate “a systemic . . . series or overall flow of events as opposed 
to a mere aggregate of random acts.”
118
The object of an attack may be civilian victims of any nationality, eth-
nicity, or may have other distinguishing features. While it is not required 
that the entire civilian population of a given geographical area be targeted, 
the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack and cannot 
merely be an incidental victim of the attack.
119
Given the broad interpretation adopted in the jurisprudence of the Court 
with regard to this requirement, it may be possible to classify the alleged 
conduct of the fossil fuel industry as an “attack.” The documents and find-
ings mentioned in Part II indicate that the alleged conduct involved “the 
multiple commission of acts,” and it constitutes “a series or overall flow of 
events.” The fact that the attack may be non-violent also supports this no-
tion.
As for the “direction” of the attack, it may be claimed that the fossil 
fuel companies (or their officials) did not “direct” an attack against a civil-
ian population. Yet, the conduct studies show that although the fossil fuel 
companies allegedly  knew that their actions were likely to produce severe 
environmental consequences, they nevertheless did not alter their conduct in 
light of that knowledge. Arguably, this alleged conduct should be viewed as 
equivalent to “directing” an attack on a civilian population.
120
In this context, it is perhaps useful to analogize to the principle of pro-
portionality, discussed above in the context of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute. The principle is manifested, inter alia, in article 57(2)(a)(iii) 
of Additional Protocol I which reads:
an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent 
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special pro-
tection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
115. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3 (“The acts need not 
constitute a military attack.”).
116. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 155. 
117. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 80 (as provided for in article 7(2)(a) 
of the Rome Statute).
118. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, ¶ 209 (June 12, 2014). 
119. Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 75–76 (June 15, 2009); Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Decision, ¶ 82.
120. The question of the required mens rea that derives from this assertion will be dis-
cussed below.
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combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
121
Indeed, international humanitarian law and international criminal law 
consider inflicting collateral damage that is excessive in relation to the an-
ticipated military advantage to be a grave breach of Additional Protocol I
122
and as a war crime respectively.
123
The principle of proportionality is also 
manifested in the interpretation given to article 6 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (the right to life). According 
to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36  on article 6 of the 
ICCPR, “indiscriminate attacks, [and] failure to apply the principles of pre-
caution and proportionality . . . would also violate [the right to life in] article 
6 of the Covenant.”
124
To pull the analogy full circle, in the context of the alleged climate 
crimes, fossil fuel companies’ desire to make maximum profit may be con-
sidered as the equivalent of a drive for “military advantage,” and the severe 
and irreversible impacts of climate change may be the equivalent of “collat-
eral damage” expected to occur. Thus, though the concept of proportionality 
does not directly apply to peacetime conduct, this analogy may support the 
notion that, to prove an attack was “directed,” it is sufficient to show that 
the perpetrator knew about the potential consequences of his or her action 
on the civilian population, and nevertheless continued that action.
125
There-
fore, when corporations (or corporate executives) engage in  an activity that 
is expected to cause severe and irreversible “collateral damage”—such as 
the effects of climate change—they may be found to have “directed” an at-
tack against a civilian population.
ii. A State or Organizational Policy
This contextual element requires the attacks against any civilian popula-
tion to have been committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or or-
ganizational policy to commit such attack.”
126
The Elements of Crimes offer 
further clarification, stating that “[i]t is understood that [the term] ‘policy to 
commit such an attack’ requires that the State or organization actively pro-
121. Additional Protocol I, supra note 82, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
122. See id., art. 85(3)(b).
123. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
124. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life art. 64, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment 36]; see also id. art. 66 (stress-
ing that “[t]he threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, 
which are indiscriminate in effect and are of a nature to cause destruction of human life on a 
catastrophic scale is incompatible with respect for the right to life and may amount to a crime 
under international law”).
125. This notion also pertains to the mental element required, as will be discussed be-
low.
126. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
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mote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.”
127
It should 
be emphasized that a “policy” may, in exceptional circumstances, be im-
plemented by a deliberate failure to take action that is consciously aimed at 
encouraging such attack.
128
The terms “policy” and “State or organizational”—which are not de-
fined in the Statute—were interpreted by the Court as requirements aimed at
ensur[ing] that the attack, even if carried out over a large geograph-
ical area or directed against a large number of victims, must still be 
thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern. It must also be 
conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or 
private resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of 
persons who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with 
the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population. The policy need not be explicitly defined by the 
organisational group. Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed 
or organised—as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of vio-
lence—will satisfy this criterion.
129
The conduct studies in Part II suggest that the fossil fuel companies al-
legedly acted in accordance with a carefully planned and organized policy, 
intended to undermine the public understanding of scientific research, pro-
mote climate change denial, and use science and public skepticism to pre-
vent environmental regulation. The conduct studies and findings also 
showed that these fossil fuel companies’ actions were allegedly conducted, 
inter alia, by the “Smoke and Fumes Committee”—a group created specifi-
cally for this purpose.
A key question pertaining to the “organizational” requirement is wheth-
er it requires the involvement of a state-like organization. In this sense, the 
policy requirement “is essential for distinguishing international crimes from 
‘ordinary’ domestic criminality,”
130
and “functions as a safeguard [so] that 
the ICC does not deal with sporadic instances of large-scale violence.”
131
In 
the Kenya decision, the Court stressed that “the formal nature of a group and 
the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion” but rather 
“a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the capability to per-
form acts which infringe on basic human values.”
132
The Court determined 
127. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3; cf. Cupido, supra
note 110, (arguing that it is not clear whether the policy requirement is an autonomous ele-
ment of crime or a factual circumstance).
128. Id. art. 7, introduction, ¶ 3 n.6.
129. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 84; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-
01/04- 01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 396 (Oct. 14, 2008). 
130. See Cupido, supra note 110.
131. Thomas Obel Hansen, The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity: Les-
sons from and for the Case of Kenya, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 39 (2011).
132. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 90.
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that “organizations not linked to a State may, for the purposes of the Statute, 
elaborate and carryout a policy to commit an attack against a civilian popu-
lation.”
133
It was also stated that
the determination of whether a given group qualifies as an organi-
zation under the Statute must be made on a case-by-case basis. In 
making this determination, the Chamber may take into account a 
number of considerations, inter alia: (i) whether the group is under 
a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; (ii) wheth-
er the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the 
group exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) 
whether the group has criminal activities against the civilian popu-
lation as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group articulates, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population; 
(vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which fulfils some 
or all of the abovementioned criteria.
134
The Court emphasized, though, that these considerations “do not consti-
tute a rigid legal definition, and do not need to be exhaustively fulfilled.”
135
Accordingly, a private entity, such as a multinational fossil fuel corporation,
may qualify as an “organization” under the Statute.
It should be noted that in a dissenting opinion to the Kenya decision, 
Judge Kaul expressed a more restrictive interpretive approach with regard to 
the “organizational” requirement:
136
An “organization” may be a private en-
tity (a non-state actor, and not an organ of a state or acting on behalf of a 
state), however, “organizations” should still “partake of some characteristics 
of a State” such as:
(a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established and acts for 
a common purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) which 
is under responsible command or adopted a certain degree of hier-
archical structure including, as a minimum, some kind of policy 
level; (e) with the capacity to impose the policy on its members and 
to sanction them; and (f) which has the capacity and means availa-
ble to attack any civilian population on a large scale.
137
133. Id. ¶ 92.
134. Id. ¶ 93.
135. Id.
136. Id. ¶¶ 38–40 (Kaul, J., dissenting). Judge Kaul compared the English text of the 
Statute to other languages (French, Spanish, and Arabic), and concluded that whereas accord-
ing to the English text, the “policy” needs only to be “organizational,” the text in other lan-
guages clearly refers to the requirement that a policy be adopted by an “organization,” “which 
established or at least endorsed a policy to commit such an attack.”
137. Id. ¶ 51.
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These criteria, according to the dissent, are meant to distinguish an “organi-
zation” from “groups of organized crime, a mob, groups of (armed) civilians 
or criminal gangs.”
138
Additionally, “‘organizational policy’ must be estab-
lished at the policymaking level of the ‘organization.’”
139
Judge Kaul also warned against expanding the concept of crimes 
against humanity to any infringement of human rights, as well as against the 
“banalization” or “trivialization” of the crimes listed in the Statute,
140
due to 
the fact that “the ICC serves as a beacon of justice intervening in limited 
cases where the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole have been committed.”
141
Yet even under the dissent’s strict interpretation, a private entity such as 
a multinational fossil fuel corporation may be recognized as an “organiza-
tion.” Indeed, though multinational corporations do not “exercise control 
over part of the territory of a State,” they clearly are “a collectivity of per-
sons” that were “established and act for a common purpose . . . over a pro-
longed period of time.” They have “adopted a certain degree of hierarchical 
structure including . . . some kind of policy level” and have the “capacity to 
impose the policy on [their] members and to sanction them.” They also have 
“the capacity and means available to attack any civilian population on a 
large scale” (in the non-violent sense of “attack”), as well as “the means and 
resources available to reach the gravity of systemic injustice in which parts 
of the civilian population find themselves.”
142
As presented in the CIEL Smoke and Fume Report, “the petroleum in-
dustry has long been highly coordinated, acting through centralized industry 
associations.”
143
The Committee on Smoke and Fumes was allegedly estab-
lished to fund research into the causes of air pollution and “to actively 
communicate with ‘interested organizations in industry, research, govern-
ment, and the public,’” in order “to avoid ‘the hasty passage of a law or 
laws for the control of a given air pollution situation.’”
144
These findings 
demonstrate that fossil fuel companies may qualify as organizations for the 
purposes of their prosecution for crimes against humanity.
Indeed, in opposing the recognition of a private entity as an organiza-
tion in the context of article 7 of the Rome Statute, Judge Kaul’s dissenting 
opinion in the Kenya decision resorted to a “slippery slope” argument, 
warning against the “banalization” of this category of crimes. However, 
given the severity of the climate crisis, which is viewed as a “common con-
138. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision,  ¶ 55; see also 1 M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED TEXT, 151–52 (2005).
139. Id. ¶ 68.
140. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 55 (Kaul, J., dissenting).
141. Id. ¶ 65.
142. Id. ¶ 66.
143. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
144. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
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cern of humankind,”
145
and considering the alleged conduct of the fossil fuel 
companies described above (and in particular the alleged decades-long, 
carefully planned campaign to mislead the public, shareholders, and poli-
cymakers), the fear of banalization does not appear to be relevant.
iii. Widespread or Systematic Attack
This element requires that the act was “committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack.”
146
In the jurisprudence of the Court, these two 
conditions—widespread and systematic—have been interpreted as disjunc-
tive, meaning that “the alleged acts must be either widespread or systematic 
to warrant classification as crimes against humanity.”
147
This requirement 
was said to be aimed at “exclud[ing] isolated or random acts from the notion 
of crimes against humanity.”
148
Broadly speaking, the Court has also 
stressed that “the adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of 
the attack and the number of targeted persons, whereas the adjective ‘sys-
tematic’ refers to the organised nature of the acts of violence and the im-
probability of their random occurrence.”
149
More specifically, the Court has interpreted the term “widespread” as 
requiring that the attack be “massive, frequent, carried out collectively with 
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”
150
A
widespread attack may be the “cumulative effect of a series of inhumane 
acts or the singular effect of an inhumane act of extraordinary magni-
tude.”
151
Similarly, it may be either an attack “carried out over a large geo-
graphical area or an attack in a small geographical area directed against a
large number of civilians.”
152
145. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Par-
is Agreement].
146. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).
147. Situation in the Republic of Kenya Decision, ¶¶ 94–95 (emphasis added); 
TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 156. But see SCHABAS, COMMENTARY, supra
note 38, at 165–66 (stressing that although it has been argued that these requirements—
”widespread” and “systematic”—are cumulative, there is little practical significance to this 
approach since the two conditions tend to overlap).
148. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 94; TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY,
supra note 40, at 156 (noting that this was also the approach taken by the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission (“UNWCC”) “speaking of crimes ‘which either by their magnitude and 
savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied . . . endan-
gered the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind.’”).
149. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
¶ 394 (Oct. 14, 2008).
150. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision,  ¶ 95.
151. Id.
152. Prosecutor v. Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 83 (June 15, 2009).
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As for the term “systematic,” it was interpreted as requiring that the acts 
of violence “be characterized as organized in nature and manifesting a pat-
tern ‘in the sense of non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on
a regular basis.’”
153
For instance, an attack was considered “systematic” 
when it “lasted for over five years and the acts of violence of which it was 
comprised followed, to a considerable extent, a similar pattern.”
154
On the face of it, the alleged conduct discussed in this article satisfies 
both requirements: The effects of climate change are experienced across the 
globe, by a large number of victims, including people, communities, and 
wildlife, and it will most probably have a profound effect on future genera-
tions. Climate impacts are known to be massive, frequent, and of a large-
scale nature.
155
In light of these characteristics of climate change, it seems 
very likely that the attack at issue may be considered as “widespread.”
Due to the fact that these requirements—widespread and systematic—
were interpreted as being disjunctive, there is no need to show a climate 
crimes attack is both “widespread” and “systematic.” Nonetheless, it seems 
that the alleged attack at issue is indeed “systematic.” The documents dis-
cussed in Part II (the conduct research and findings) suggest that the attack 
was carefully planned and carried out over decades, and that it was repeated 
and was not of a random nature. According to the CIEL Smoke and Fumes 
Report, the events described in the report “are not isolated incidents, but ra-
ther demonstrate a systemic, decades-long pattern of climate understanding, 
denial, and obstruction,”
156
and “the industry . . . engaged in ongoing and 
systematic efforts to convince the public that climate science was uncertain, 
climate risks were nonexistent or exaggerated, or that vital measures to re-
duce carbon emissions and promote cleaner energies were unwarranted or 
not feasible.”
157
iv. A Nexus Between the Individual Act and the Attack
This element requires a link between the acts committed by the accused 
and the attack against the civilian population. For this purpose, “the Cham-
ber must consider the nature, aims and consequences” of the act.
158
“[I]solated acts which clearly differ, in their nature, aims and consequences, 
from other acts forming part of an attack, would fall outside the scope of ar-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [“IPCC”], CLIMATE CHANGE 
2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014); IPCC, Global Warming 
of 1.5 °C (Oct. 6, 2018), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15.
156. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 18.
157. Id. at 19.
158. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision, ¶ 98.
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ticle 7(1) of the Statute.”
159
Although it is not necessary to show that an act 
itself was widespread or systematic—even a single act may satisfy the re-
quirements of article 7(1)—it is necessary to show that the act was commit-
ted in the broader context of the attack, “in terms of [its] characteristics, na-
ture, aims, targets and alleged perpetrators, as well as times and location.”
160
The documents discussed in Part II reveal a series of allegedly carefully 
planned acts, whose nature, aims, and consequences suggest that they were 
committed as part of the broader context of the alleged attack.
v. Knowledge of the Attack
Article 7 requires that the punishable act be committed not just with a 
nexus to, but “with knowledge of,” the widespread or systematic attack. The 
Elements of Crime clarify the requisite knowledge, for each punishable act, 
which exists when “the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or in-
tended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.”
161
The Court has interpreted this requirement 
as relating to the link between the individual punishable act committed by 
the accused and the broader attack, in the sense that it must be proven that 
the accused knew of the attack “in general terms,”
162
as well as of the fact 
that his or her acts would be part of it.
163
Nevertheless, there is no need for 
the Prosecutor to show that the accused had detailed knowledge pertaining 
to the entire attack, nor is it necessary to show that he or she had the precise 
details of the policy or plan of the state or organization.
164
According to the Court’s jurisprudence, such knowledge
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as: the ac-
cused’s position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an im-
portant role in the broader criminal campaign; his presence at the 
159. Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, Decision Pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation, ¶ 89 (Nov. 15, 
2011); SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 166–67.
160. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Decision, ¶ 209.
161. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79.
162. See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 87 (June 15, 2009).
163. TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 175-76; Prosecutor v. Gombo, Deci-
sion, ¶ 87. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has rejected the interpretation that “knowledge also 
includes the conduct ‘of a person taking a deliberate risk in the hope that the risk does not 
cause injury.’” Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 126–28
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. 
IT-95-14-T, Judgment ¶ 254 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); 
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 168.
164. In the Elements of Crimes, it is explicitly stated that the knowledge requirement 
“should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all charac-
teristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization.” 
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 81.
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scene of the crimes; his references to the superiority of his group 
over the enemy group; and the general historical and political envi-
ronment in which the acts occurred.
165
It may also be inferred from factors such as “the scope and gravity of the 
acts perpetrated, the nature of the crimes committed, and the degree of 
which they are common knowledge.”
166
Notably, according to article 30(1)—which is the general mens rea re-
quirement in the Rome Statute—it is necessary to show that “the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”
167
The relationship be-
tween the general requirement of article 30 and the knowledge requirement 
of article 7(1), is described in the Gombo decision: Article 7(1) “is an aspect
of the mental element under article 30(3) of the Statute.”
168
A somewhat nu-
anced view is expressed in the Triffterer Commentary, stating that the 
knowledge requirement of article 7(1) “constitutes an additional mental el-
ement to be distinguished from the general mens rea requirement of article 
30.”
169
Either way, under both approaches, it is necessary to prove the two 
different components of article 30—intent and knowledge—in order to es-
tablish criminal responsibility.
The main question in this respect pertains to the standard for intent un-
der article 30 of the Statute. According to article 30, it is necessary to show 
that the accused “means to engage in the conduct”
170
and that he or she 
“means to cause the consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordi-
nary course of events.”
171
Additionally, it should be proven that the accused 
had “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.”
172
The article 30 requirements apply to the dif-
ferent material elements of each crime in the Statute, but “[t]he exact scope 
of this application . . . has to be inferred for each crime depending on the 
specific material elements set out in the definition of the crime.”
173
In the case of the alleged climate crimes, it may be assumed that fossil 
fuel companies (or their corporate officials) were not driven by an intention 
to cause damage to the environment, but rather by their aim to maximize 
profit, with environmental damage only a by-product of their conduct.
174
165. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 402.
166. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 168; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, ¶ 
259.
167. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(1).
168. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 87 (emphasis added).
169. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 176 (emphasis added).
170. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(2)(a).
171. Id. art. 30(2)(b).
172. Id. art. 30(3).
173. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 1113.
174. Cf. Commentary of the ILC to Article 26, ¶ 6 (regarding the word “willfully” in 
article 26 of the ILC draft). 
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Nonetheless, the conduct studies suggest that these companies “have been 
aware of the risks of climate change, and their products’ role in exacerbat-
ing those risks, for at least six decades,”
175
and yet they have allegedly con-
tinued to peddle their products and use industry-funded research in order to 
increase public skepticism about climate change.
176
Arguably, such conduct may qualify as equivalent to intent,
177
if the 
mental state of dolus eventualis falls within the scope of article 30 of the 
Statute. Under one common definition of dolus eventualis, a perpetrator acts 
with this mental state if he or she “foresees that his or her action is likely to 
produce its prohibited consequences, and nevertheless willingly takes the 
risk of so acting.”
178
The question whether article 30 may be read to include dolus eventualis
is quite controversial:”[T]he drafting history of the Rome Statute suggests 
that dolus eventualis was explicitly considered and rejected by the drafters 
of the Rome Statute, because doing so ‘might send the wrong signal that 
these forms of culpability were sufficient for criminal liability as a general 
rule.’”
179
This may support the idea that dolus eventualis does not fall within 
the scope of article 30. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber in the Gombo decision 
adopted this approach, concluding that “such concepts [dolus eventualis,
recklessness, or any lower form of culpability] are not captured by article 30 
of the Statute. This conclusion is supported by the express language of the 
phrase ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events,’ which does not accom-
modate a lower standard than the one required by dolus directus in the sec-
ond degree (oblique intention).”180 Nevertheless,  “commentators and some 
judges continue to maintain that dolus eventualis falls within the Rome 
Statute’s Article 30 default rule.”
181
No doubt, the question of whether dolus eventualis falls within the 
scope of article 30 or not may be a crucial one with regard to the possibility 
of classifying the alleged climate crimes as crimes under the Rome Statute. 
Whereas the “knowledge” requirement of article 7 may be satisfied by the 
findings discussed in Part II, suggesting that the companies knew about the 
likely consequences of their conduct, the general “intent” requirement under 
article 30(1) poses a substantial bar. As mentioned above, it seems that the 
corporations did not intend to harm the environment, but rather to make 
175. See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
176. Id. at 21.
177. According to this approach, an action and its consequences may be viewed as “a 
package deal,” making “the distinction between intent and foresight . . . illusory.” See Jens D. 
Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79, 126 (2013).
178. Id. at 88.
179. Id. at 101.
180. See Prosecutor v. Gombo, Decision, ¶ 360 (emphasis in original); see also
SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 632.
181. Ohlin, supra note 177, at 103–10 (offering several arguments to support the inclu-
sion of dolus eventualis in article 30). 
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maximum profit. Yet if a reduced mental state such as dolus eventualis sat-
isfies article 30, the alleged climate crimes may nevertheless be prosecuta-
ble before the ICC.
The next part will examine the relevant punishable acts listed in this 
category of crimes.
2. Relevant Punishable Acts
The most relevant punishable acts listed after the chapeau of article 7 
are probably “deportation or forcible transfer of population”
182
and the re-
sidual crime of “other inhumane acts.”
183
This section will examine their ap-
plicability to the alleged conduct of the oil and gas corporations, focusing 
on liability for the forced displacement of communities vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change.
184
i. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population
Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute defines “deportation or forcible 
transfer of population” as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by 
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted under international law.” Arguably, 
since the effects of climate change are associated with migration, the alleged 
conduct of the fossil fuel companies may be considered “other coercive 
acts” causing forced displacement.
The Elements of Crime clarify that “[t]he term ‘forcibly’ is not restrict-
ed to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by tak-
ing advantage of a coercive environment.”
185
In a similar vein, the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber II has stated that “deportation or forcible transfer of popula-
tion is an open-conduct crime”
186
and that “in order to establish that the 
crime of deportation or forcible transfer of population is consummated, the 
Prosecutor has to prove that one or more acts that the perpetrator has per-
formed produced the effect to deport or forcibly transfer the victim.”
187
182. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(d). 
183. Id. art. 7(1)(k).
184. See IPCC, IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land: Summary for Poli-
cymakers (Aug. 2019), at A.5.7 (stating that “[c]hanges in climate can amplify environmental-
ly induced migration both within countries and across borders”); Anouch Missirian & Wolf-
ram Schlenker, Asylum Applications Respond to Temperature Fluctuations,  358 SCI. 1610–14
(Dec. 2017) (suggesting that climate change will drive a huge increase in the number of mi-
grants seeking asylum in Europe if current trends continue); ANA NÚÑEZ, CIEL, THE INUIT 
CASE STUDY (2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Inuit_CaseStudy_Sep07.pdf.
185. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 79, art. 7(1)(d) n.12.
186. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) to the Rome Statute, ¶¶ 244–45 (Jan. 23, 2012).
187. Id.
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Therefore, in order to establish that fossil fuel companies have committed 
the crime of deportation or forcible transfer of population, the Prosecutor 
will need to prove that their alleged conduct has “produced the effect” of 
forced displacement.
According to this interpretation, and given that the prohibition is aimed 
at “safeguarding the right and aspiration of individuals to live in their com-
munities and homes without outside interference,”
188
the acts allegedly 
committed by the fossil fuel companies may be found to have produced the 
effect of forcible displacement.
True, there is a considerable gap between the alleged conduct and this 
outcome because it may take years, or even decades, for climate change to 
cause forced displacement, and not only is migration the last link in a long 
chain of climate effects, but it is also driven by a multitude of factors. These 
characteristics may constitute a major difficulty with regard to the plausibil-
ity of classifying the alleged climate crimes as crimes of forcible displace-
ment (and may also prove to be an obstacle with regard to temporal jurisdic-
tion).
189
The mens rea for this punishable act requires both “intent and 
knowledge relating to the forcible displacement of persons from territory in 
which they are lawfully present.”
190
According to the conduct studies and 
findings mentioned in Part II, fossil fuel companies’ officials allegedly 
knew, through cutting-edge scientific research, about the different impacts 
of climate change. That being said, however, the multi-causal nature of the 
harm as well as the considerable gap between the alleged conduct and its 
specific outcome may prove to be yet another hurdle with regard to the do-
lus eventualis standard of intent, since it may be difficult to show that the 
corporate officials foresaw that their actions would produce these specific 
consequences. Nonetheless, the robust body of documentary evidence de-
scribed in Part II indicates that oil and gas companies “had a deep and pro-
found understanding of the relationships between sea levels, atmospheric 
temperatures, and carbon in the environment.”
191
These documents suggest 
that oil and gas corporations and corporate executives have been aware of 
the effects of rising levels of CO2 and increased temperatures, including 
melting ice caps, sea level rise, and warming oceans.
192
This documentary 
evidence may be used to establish the required mens rea for this punishable 
act.
188. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 218 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003).
189. It has been argued that the act of forcible displacement is not of continuous nature, 
since it puts an emphasis on the conduct itself. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 
40, at 268.
190. TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 268.
191. CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
192. Id. at 12, 15.
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ii. Other Inhumane Acts
Article 7(1)(k) also includes “other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health” as one of the punishable acts under this category of 
crimes.
Contrary to the Nuremberg Charter and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Statutes, the Rome Statute contains certain 
limitations on what constitutes an inhumane act, compelling a narrower and 
more restrictive interpretation than given to similar provisions in those in-
struments.
193
These limitations pertain both to the action constituting an in-
humane act, which must be “of similar character” to the other acts in article 
7(1), and to the consequence required as the result of an inhumane act,
194
i.e., “great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health.” The similarity assessment, which “involves a value judgment”
195
is 
to be conducted “on a case-by-case basis.”
196
Therefore, the possibility of 
classifying the alleged climate crimes as “other inhumane acts” depends, to 
a great extent, on prosecutorial and judicial discretion.
It has also been emphasized by the Court that “inhumane acts are to be 
considered as serious violations of international customary law and the basic 
rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the norms of international 
human rights law.”
197
The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II has noted that:
the language of the relevant statutory provision and the Elements of 
Crimes, as well as the fundamental principles of criminal law, make 
it plain that this residual category of crimes against humanity must 
be interpreted conservatively and must not be used to expand un-
critically the scope of crimes against humanity.
198
Moreover, due to the residual nature of this crime, the Court has con-
cluded that “if a conduct could be charged as another specific crime under 
this provision, its charging as other inhumane acts is impermissible.”
199
Hence, if the Prosecutor determines that the alleged climate crimes fall 
within the scope of “deportation or forcible transfer of population,” they 
may not be charged as “other inhumane acts” (unless there is “at least one 
193. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 207.
194. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 450.
195. TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 238, n.576.
196. Id. at 239.
197. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision, ¶ 448.
198. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 269 (Jan. 23, 2012).
199. Id.; see also TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 237.
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materially distinct element that is not adequately reflected in other acts un-
der paragraph 1”).
200
When examining the different cases in which the Court has made use of 
this provision, it seems that it has primarily been applied to cases of extreme 
violence, and seldom has it been discussed with regard to cases of lesser se-
riousness. Still, it may be applicable to acts of destruction of property, “to 
the extent that there is evidence that it causes extreme mental suffering.”
201
As for the mens rea requirement, article 7(1)(k) explicitly requires that the 
acts be committed with the intent to cause “great suffering, or serious injury 
to body or to mental or physical health.” This requirement obviously nar-
rows the scope of this provision even more and makes it difficult to prose-
cute the alleged climate crimes at issue, which were not committed with 
such intent (unless a more relaxed understanding of “intent” is adopted, 
such as dolus eventualis). 202
C. Climate Crimes as Genocide
The term “genocide” was first introduced in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin. 
Though not included in the Nuremberg judgment,
203
the crime of genocide 
was recognized in the 1946 General Assembly Resolution 96(1) and, later 
on, in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.
204
As opposed to Lauterpacht’s approach (manifested, as discussed above, 
in “crimes against humanity”), “which was motivated by a desire to rein-
force the protection of each individual, irrespective of which group he or 
she happened to belong to,”
205
Lemkin focused on the group, since he be-
lieved that “individuals were targeted because they were members of a par-
ticular group, not because of their individual qualities.”
206
Following Lemkin’s approach, the chapeau of article 6 of the Rome 
Statute defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such . . .” As the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court has stated, “the defini-
tion of the crime of genocide aims at protecting the existence of a specific 
group or people.”
207
It should be noted that the provision is restricted to na-
200. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 237.
201. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 209; see also Prosecutor v. 
Muthaura, Decision, ¶ 279.
202. See text accompanying notes 180–184.
203. See SANDS, supra note 13, at 372.
204. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
205. See SANDS, supra note 13, at 291.
206. Id.
207. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 135; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 115.
2020] Prosecuting Climate Crimes at the ICC 525
tional, ethnical, racial or religious groups,
208
following the definition of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
209
In limited circumstances, environmental destruction might qualify as an 
international crime of genocide: “In some cases, particularly where small 
indigenous populations are closely tied economically, spiritually and cultur-
ally to their land and local environment, severe environmental impacts can 
threaten the cultural survival of the group.”
210
However, proving mens rea may be a substantial obstacle in this con-
text.
211
As “one of the worst crimes known to humankind,”
212
genocide re-
quires specific intent (dolus specialis).213 Notably, however, in the case of a 
plan or a policy, the relevance of specific intent declines dramatically, and 
the focus is on knowledge of the plan or policy rather than on intent (a 
“knowledge-based approach”).
214
Because the adverse effects of climate change are experienced by indi-
viduals and communities across the globe, irrespective of their affiliation to 
a certain group, it cannot be claimed that a specific group was targeted by 
the fossil fuel companies, nor can it be asserted that these companies had 
any intent to do so. And even if the fossil fuel companies knew with sub-
stantial certainty about the eventual need of certain groups to migrate due to 
climate impacts, they most probably did not have a plan aimed at achieving 
this outcome.
Curiously enough, in 2010, a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute 
was submitted by Polly Higgins, urging the ILC to add a fifth crime to the 
Rome Statute—the crime of ecocide.
215
The proposed amendment, which 
builds on Lemkin’s concept of “cultural genocide,”
216
defines “ecocide” as 
“the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given ter-
ritory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that 
peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely 
208. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 135–36.
209. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 204.
210. See Hunter, Private Sector Liability for Environmental Harm Under International 
Law, supra note 84, at 38.
211. Id. at 39.
212. Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-17-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
213. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 25.
214. See id.
215. See generally Anja Gauger et al., The Ecocide Project: ‘Ecocide Is the Missing 5th 
Crime Against Peace’, THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSORTIUM AT THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED 
STUDIES, U. LONDON (2012). 
216. See id. at 6–7.
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diminished.”
217
Additionally, a model law suggested by Higgins defined the 
crime of ecocide as those
acts or omissions committed recklessly in times of peace or conflict 
by any senior person within the course of State, corporate or any 
other entity’s activity which cause, contribute to, or may be ex-
pected to cause or contribute to serious ecological, climate or cul-
tural loss or damage to or destruction of ecosystem(s) of a given 
territory(ies), such that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants has 
been or will be severely diminished.
218
For the purpose of the discussion here, it is worth mentioning that arti-
cle 3(a) of the proposed model law defined “climate loss” or “damage” or 
“destruction” as “impact(s) of one or more of the following occurrences, un-
restricted by State or jurisdictional boundaries: (i) rising sea-levels, (ii) hur-
ricanes, typhoons or cyclones, (iii) earthquakes, (iv) other climate occur-
rences.”
219
Article 3(d) added that “[f]or the purposes of paragraph 1: the 
Paris Agreement of 4 November 2016 shall be considered established prem-
ise for prior knowledge by State, corporate or any other entity’s senior per-
son, or any other person of superior responsibility.”
220
It goes without saying 
that if the crime of ecocide was incorporated into the Rome Statute, it would 
be extremely relevant to the alleged climate crimes at issue, though attempts 
to apply it to past crimes would raise issues of retroactivity.
Although this proposal was not adopted at the international level, some 
states have included a crime of ecocide in their own national penal codes. 
These states include: Vietnam, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Republic of Mol-
dova, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
221
If more 
states will follow suit, a norm of customary international law may emerge; 
however, this process will obviously take time and also would not apply ret-
roactively.
D. Interim Conclusions
When examining whether the alleged conduct discussed in this paper 
can be prosecuted under the Rome Statute, it seems that several provisions 
of the Rome Statute may apply to the alleged climate crimes. Amongst the 
different categories of crimes considered here, the category of crimes 
against humanity is probably the most applicable one. Yet, even with regard 
217. Polly Higgins, ERADICATING ECOCIDE: LAWS AND GOVERNANCE TO PREVENT 
THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR PLANET 62 (2010); see also ECOCIDE LAW, Proposed Amendment 
to the Rome Statute, https://ecocidelaw.com/the-law/what-is-ecocide. 
218. Anthony J. Colangelo & Peter Hayes, An International Tribunal for the Use of Nu-
clear Weapons, 2 J. PEACE & NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 219, 232 (2019).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Gauger et al., supra note 215, at 12.
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to this category of crimes, many doubts and uncertainties remain as to its 
suitability for prosecuting climate crimes.
In contrast to other crimes, the alleged climate crimes at issue are con-
sequential in nature and have an indirect effect both in the sense that they 
affect communities and people across the globe irrespective of the place 
where the crimes were allegedly committed, and because there is a major 
time interval between the alleged acts and their consequences, since it may 
take a very long period of time before the effects of a certain act are evident. 
These unique features pose substantial challenges, with regard to the ele-
ment of mens rea as well as offense specific requirements.
The core crimes in the Statute were tailored—and therefore are far more 
suited—to the prosecution of actions that take place in a specific time 
frame, at a particular location on the globe, and that follow a simple pattern 
or causal chain. Naturally, when dealing with these “classic” forms of 
crimes, it is easier to examine questions of mens rea and the suitability of 
the different punishable acts to the alleged conduct. Also, questions regard-
ing temporal jurisdiction may be simply resolved, since the harm likely oc-
curred at or around the same time as the offense.
By contrast, climate change is a phenomenon that evolves over a long 
period of time, as emissions of GHGs stay in the atmosphere for decades 
(and even longer), and the changes they cause are gradual in nature. Also, 
GHGs emitted at a certain place spread in the atmosphere across the globe, 
hence their effect is experienced not only in the place where they were emit-
ted, but also in remote parts of the world. Ultimately, scientific data and 
modeling is required to explain the causal link between the causes and the 
effects of climate change.  That being said, however, it should be empha-
sized that judicial tribunals are used to dealing with these sorts of complexi-
ties (by using expert opinions, for instance); hence, these difficulties should 
not stand in the way of prosecuting climate crimes as long as these crimes 
fall within the scope of the Rome Statute.
Still, the Rome Statute was not drafted with this kind of crime in mind, 
and, as in many other instances, it seems that the law has not caught up with 
reality.
222
Arguably, it  is the task of the courts to translate the written norms 
to the changing landscape of crimes, insofar as the language of these norms 
allows such translation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
222. As has been stated by the ICRC in relation to common article 3 of the Geneva Con-
vention: 
It is always dangerous to try to go into too much detail—especially in this domain. 
However great the care taken in drawing up a list of all the various forms of inflic-
tion, it would never be possible to catch up with the imagination of future torturers 
who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a 
list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes. 
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War 39 (1958, reprt. 1994); TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, 
supra note 40, at 235.
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ond Circuit stated in the Filartiga case, in the context of the Alien Tort 
Statute,
223
“[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it 
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world 
today.”
224
This approach has the advantage of making use of existing offences to 
bring immediate action against perpetrators. Nevertheless, it may contradict 
the principle of non-retroactivity,
225
and raise concerns with regard to legit-
imacy. The application of this approach to criminal law is even more con-
troversial, as it runs counter to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
A different approach, taken by several practitioners and scholars, sug-
gests that the Rome Statute should be amended to explicitly include a sui 
generis crime against the environment.226 Whereas this option may theoreti-
cally be a more appropriate and legitimate one, amendment has its disad-
vantages, in particular, its dependence on political will and global coopera-
223. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
224. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also SÉBASTIEN JODOIN &
MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2013) (“The criminalization of new 
forms of harm is consistent with the development of international criminal law, which can be 
seen as the successive extension of the principle of individual accountability to a constantly 
expanding list of serious violations in international law—piracy and war crimes to begin with; 
followed by crimes against humanity, aggression, and genocide in the postwar era; later ex-
tending to the other crimes of apartheid and torture; and potentially expanding to offences 
such as terrorism in the near term. What is more, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
have—not without some controversy—consistently expanded the scope of application of ex-
isting international crimes to cover a growing variety of acts and conduct, victims, and con-
text.”).
225. See Markus Kotzur, The Temporal Dimension: Non-Retroactivity and Its Discon-
tents, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Christian J. Tams et al. eds., 
2014). 
226. See, e.g., STEVEN FREELAND, ADDRESSING THE INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF 
THE ENVIRONMENT DURING WARFARE UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, at 228–29 (suggesting the addition of a crime of environmental destruction 
during an armed conflict); Gauger et al., supra note 222, at 12; Robert McLaughlin, Improv-
ing Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors Responsible for Environmental 
Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377, 392 (2000); Hunter, Private Sector Liabil-
ity for Environmental Harm Under International Law, supra note 84, at 59–60. Others have 
proposed a designated tribunal for environmental issues, though these proposals do not focus 
on criminal liability. See generally Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civ-
il Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014); Kenneth F. McCallion & H. Rajan Sharma, 
Environmental Justice Without Borders: The Need for an International Court of the Environ-
ment to Protect Fundamental Environmental Rights, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON.
(2000). It should also be noted in this context that one of the drafts of the Paris Agreement 
suggested the establishment of an International Tribunal of Climate Justice. However, this 
tribunal was intended “to address cases of non-compliance of the commitments of developed 
country Parties,” and, naturally, it did not deal with corporations. Ultimately, this suggestion 
was not accepted in the final document. See Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action, Draft Agreement and Draft Decision on Workstreams 1 and 2, art. 11.7, 
No. ADP 2-11 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
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tion.
227
Additionally, even if States Parties agree to amend the Statute, it will 
take time,
228
and the amendment will most probably not apply retroactively.
In contrast, the ICC and the core crimes already listed in the Rome 
Statute may provide, in suitable cases, a ready-made solution. Notably, 
when the ILC considered adding a separate crime against the environment 
to the Rome Statute, some members argued that there was no need for a 
separate crime due to the fact that harm to the environment—where it af-
fects international peace and security—would be punishable as an interna-
tional crime under other rubrics of the Statute.
229
This approach is also re-
flected in the OTP Policy Paper, which does not mention any need to amend 
the Statute as a prerequisite for the prosecution of environmental crimes.
In light of these realities, and as at least some provisions of the Rome 
Statute may apply to the alleged climate crimes, the article will next explore 
whether the Rome Statute’s existing crimes may and should be interpreted 
to include environmental crimes. Before that, however, the article will dis-
cuss procedural hurdles to the prosecution of the alleged climate crimes.
V.  Procedural Hurdles to Prosecuting Climate Crimes
According to article 11(2) of the Rome Statute, “the Court has jurisdic-
tion only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute.”
230
Article 24(1) also clarifies, with respect to individual criminal 
responsibility, that “[n]o person shall be criminally responsible under this 
Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.”
231
This tem-
poral threshold is considered an absolute bar to prosecution,
232
deviating 
from the approach taken by previous international criminal tribunals, which 
exercised their jurisdiction retroactively.
233
227. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121 (stating that an adoption of an amendment 
to the Statute requires a two-thirds majority of State Parties). Additionally, according to article 
121(5), “any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 . . . shall enter into force for those States Par-
ties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of rati-
fication or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the 
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.” Id.
228. Due to the urgency posed by the climate crisis, time is obviously a crucial factor. 
See generally IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5, supra note 155.
229. See infra note 254.
230. It should be emphasized that article 11(2) further states that “[i]f a State becomes a 
Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with 
respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that 
State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.” Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 
11(2).
231. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 341.
232. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 657.
233. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 339.
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It is important to note that though in general the entry into force date of 
the Rome Statute is July 1, 2002,
234
there may be a different entry into force 
date for each of the States Parties, depending on the date a certain State Par-
ty accepted, approved, or acceded to the Rome Statute.
235
Therefore, ques-
tions regarding temporal jurisdiction should be determined depending on the
states involved.
Accordingly, even if the alleged acts of the fossil fuel companies are 
found to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court 
will be able to exercise jurisdiction only with regard to crimes committed 
after the relevant entry into force date.
236
Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that in cases where the jurisdiction of the Court is “triggered” pursuant to a 
Security Council referral (in accordance with article 13(b) of the Statute), 
article 11(2) does not apply, and the Court may exercise its jurisdiction with 
regard to crimes committed after July 1, 2002,
237
regardless of the specific 
circumstances pertaining to the state at issue.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that in cases of continuing crimes—
when the conduct constitutes an ongoing course of criminal activity or in 
situations where the actus reus is partially completed in the past, but its ef-
fects continue after its completion—it may be argued that due to the contin-
uous nature of the acts, the Court may exercise jurisdiction even with regard 
to acts that took place before the entry into force of the Statute.
238
In the context of the alleged acts of the fossil fuel companies, the emis-
sions made by these companies stay in the atmosphere for a long period of 
time and continue to cause climate impacts. This may also be relevant with 
regard to research funded and communications published prior to the rele-
vant entry into force date, but accessible—i.e., not removed or corrected—
after that date. In any case, all emissions and publications that were made 
after the relevant entry into force date clearly fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. Additionally, and irrespective of the question of temporal juris-
diction, both the ICTR and the ICC have held that evidence relating to acts 
committed before the entry into force date may be admissible and used in 
order to establish intent, to demonstrate a pattern of conduct, or to clarify a 
given context.
239
234. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 126(1).
235. See id. art. 126(2).
236. In this context, it should be noted that according to the CIEL Smoke and Fumes 
Report, even in recent years, “as the reality of climate change has become all but impossible 
to deny, the largest companies have adjusted their strategies from outright denial to question-
ing the human contribution to climate change, the timing and severity of impacts, and the eco-
nomic feasibility of reducing emissions.” See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES REPORT, supra note 
28, at 18.
237. SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 343.
238. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note 40, at 663–69 (referring to cases of 
forced disappearance, transfer, and forced deportation, and conscripting or enlistment of chil-
dren under the age of fifteen); see also SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 341–42. 
239. See TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY, supra note  40, at 669–70.
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Another procedural hurdle relates to article 12 of the Statute, which es-
tablishes the general rule by which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party or over crimes com-
mitted by a national of a State Party anywhere. Where the fossil fuel com-
panies are based in states that are not parties to the Rome Statute, or in cases 
where the alleged acts were committed on territories of states that are not 
party to the Statute or by nationals of states that are not parties, it may be 
argued that the Court does not have jurisdiction. Notably, however, article 
12(2) does not apply in the case of a Security council referral. Additionally, 
due to the complex structure of subsidiaries used by multinational corpora-
tions in their operations, it is likely that at least some of their acts were 
committed in the territory of a State Party or by nationals of one.
To this end, the Court recently ruled in a decision concerning the al-
leged deportation of members of the Rohingya people from the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh that “the 
Court may assert jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(2)(a) of the Statute if at 
least one element of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or part of 
such a crime is committed on the territory of a State Party to the Statute.”
240
Moreover, the Court specifically emphasized that the rationale of its deci-
sion is not restricted to the crime of deportation, and it may apply to other 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court as well.
241
Accordingly, and since the effects of climate crimes are experienced 
across the globe and are not limited to the territory of the state where they 
were allegedly committed, there may be an argument that some elements of 
a crime, or parts of a crime, were committed in the territory of a State Party, 
thus enabling the Court to assert its jurisdiction pursuant to article 12.
242
VI. Can—and Should—the Rome Statute Be Interpreted as 
Encompassing Environmental Crimes?
As an international treaty, the Rome Statute is subject to the governing 
principles of treaty interpretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).
243
Therefore, the Rome Statute “shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be giv-
en to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
240. Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a 
Ruling on Jurisdiction Under Article 19(3) of the Statute, ¶ 72 (Sept. 6, 2018). 
241. Id. ¶ 74.
242. Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that in the case of the alleged deportation of 
the Rohingya people, the different elements of the crime took place more or less in the same 
timeframe, whereas in the case of the alleged climate crimes, there is a considerable gap be-
tween the acts attributed to the corporations (or the corporate officials), on the one hand, and 
the outcome of these acts, on the other. Therefore, applying this decision to the case at hand
will most probably require broad interpretation of this decision.
243. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [“VCLT”] art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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purpose.”
244
The context of the treaty, for the purpose of interpretation, in-
cludes its preamble and annexes.
245
Several statements in the preamble to the Rome Statute may be read to 
encompass environmental crimes. For instance, the preamble opens with the 
statement that States Parties are “[c]onscious that all peoples are united by 
common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and con-
cerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.”
246
Undoubt-
edly, this “delicate mosaic” is also comprised of the environmental condi-
tions peoples and cultures depend upon. Furthermore, the recognition in the 
preamble “that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-
being of the world”
247
can also be read to include environmental crimes, 
which clearly threaten the “well-being of the world.” Finally, the goal of se-
curing the needs and interests of future generations
248
cannot be obtained 
without giving proper consideration to environmental concerns.
249
Nonetheless, one should bear in mind that as a source of criminal law, 
the Rome Statute is also governed by the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege, as well as the rule of “strict construction” drawn from national legal 
practice.
250
Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute reads: “The definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In 
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person 
244. Id. art. 31(1).
245. Id. art. 31(2).
246. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
247. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (noting that the parties were “[d]etermined to 
these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent per-
manent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with ju-
risdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole”).
248. Id.
249. See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Declaration 
on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations, Res. 29/C/31, 
art. 1 (Nov. 12, 1997). The Declaration recognizes that 
[t]he present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations 
an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity. Each 
generation inheriting the Earth temporarily should take care to use natural resources 
reasonably and ensure that life is not prejudiced by harmful modifications of the 
ecosystems and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm 
life on Earth. 
Id. art. 4. The obligation to safeguard the rights of future generations is also reflected in a 
statement by the UN Secretary-General, who described the adoption of the Rome Statute as “a 
gift of hope to future generations.” See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of Interna-
tional Courts, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 245 n.103 (2014) (citing the statement at the opening 
of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Feb. 16, 1999).
250. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 93–95 (5th ed. 2017).
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being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”
251
This interpretive approach is 
also manifested in the Elements of Crime with regard to crimes against hu-
manity,
252
providing that article 7 of the Rome Statute “must be strictly con-
strued, taking into account that crimes against humanity as defined in article 
7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole.”
253
It should also be noted that the ILC has considered adding a crime 
against the environment to the Rome Statute. Article 26 of the ILC’s draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind criminalizes  
the act of “willfully caus[ing] or order[ing] the causing of widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment.”
254
At first, it was sug-
gested that a crime against the environment would complement the category 
of crimes against humanity.
255
However, later on, environmental offenses 
were “set apart to form a new, autonomous crime.”
256
Ultimately, the draft article was not incorporated into the final text of 
the Rome Statute.
257
This may support a narrow interpretive approach to the
existing provisions, rejecting the idea that the Rome Statute may be read to 
251. See id. (arguing that this is a reaction to the liberal approach taken by the judges in 
the Tadić jurisdictional decision, discussed infra note 260).
252. There is no similar requirement in the ICC Elements of Crime with regard to war 
crimes or genocide (yet, the general rule expressed in article 22(2) applies to these crimes). 
See ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 79.
253. ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 79, introduction, ¶ 1; see also SCHABAS 
COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 152 (noting that “[o]ut of concern with the uncertain param-
eters of the crime, the drafters of the Rome Statute included extra language designed to re-
strain efforts at generous or liberal interpretation, most probably in paragraph 2 of article 7”).
254. Int’l Law Comm’n, Document ILC(XLVIII)/DC/CRD, Document on Crimes 
Against the Environment, Prepared by Mr. Christian Tomuschat, Member of the Commission, 
U.N. Doc. ILC(XLVIII)/DC/CRD.3 (Mar. 27, 1996); see SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra
note 38, at 148; Matthew Gillett, Environmental Damage and International Criminal Law, in
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND TREATY 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 224, at 94.
255. Int’l Law Comm’n, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, supra note 
254, ¶ 5-6.
256. Id. ¶ 8 (noting that—although article 26 borrowed most of its elements from article 
55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949—article 26, unlike 
article 55, also applied in times of peace outside an armed conflict); see also Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of the Forty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (Apr.–July 1991), 
reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 107, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (1991) (ex-
plaining, in the commentary to article 26, that “[t]he direct source of the present draft article is 
article 55, paragraph 1, of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions” but that 
“unlike the provision contained in the Protocol, application of this draft article is not confined 
to armed conflict”). The crime was meant to be interpreted broadly “to cover the environment 
of the human race and where the human race develops, as well as areas the preservation of 
which is of fundamental importance in protecting the environment,” i.e., “the seas, the atmos-
phere, climate, forests and other plant cover, fauna, flora and other biological elements.” Id.  
257. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Document on Crimes Against the Environment, supra note 
254, ¶ 9 (describing the different written comments that were received from governments re-
garding article 26).
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include environmental crimes. However, some members of the ILC have 
expressed the view that
there was no need for a separate article on the subject since damage 
to the environment, such as willful nuclear pollution or the poison-
ing of vital international watercourses, would, if it affected interna-
tional peace and security, be punishable as an international crime 
under other rubrics of the Code such as aggression, war crimes and 
international terrorism. In this regard, attention was drawn to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.
258
This view strongly supports interpreting the Rome Statute as encom-
passing environmental crimes, as long as these crimes affect international 
peace and security.
It may also be claimed that there is no basis to distinguish between a 
crime against the environment and a crime against people in the first place, 
since environmental and human rights are indivisibly intertwined. Arguably, 
since a crime against the environment affects people and their most funda-
mental human rights,
259
it should be punished correspondingly. This catego-
rization of environmental crimes may be viewed as following the “human-
being-oriented approach” expressed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
in the Tadić jurisdictional decision, applying “the maxim of Roman law 
hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit 
of human beings).”
260
According to this approach, the crimes listed in the 
Rome Statute should be interpreted as applying to environmental crimes 
when those affect human beings.
261
Indeed, if environmental crimes have the 
258. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Forty-
Seventh Session, supra note 229, ¶ 121; see also CASSESE ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 523 (2002) (asserting that “willful 
and serious damage to the environment was a fact of life not just for the present, but for future 
generations”). Article II of the ENMOD Convention defines “environmental modification 
techniques” as “any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, litho-
sphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.’” ENMOD Convention, supra note 
83, art. II.
259. See Marcos Orellana, Court Embraces Right to a Healthy Environment in the 
Americas: Ruling Will Empower Citizens, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 14, 2018),  
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/court-embraces-right-healthy-environment-americas 
(describing a decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights interpreting the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights to require state protection of the right to a healthy environ-
ment).
260. Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
261. It should be emphasized, though, that the ICTY Appeals Chambers based its broad 
interpretive approach, inter alia, on the unclear language of some of the provisions of the 
ICTY Statute. For instance, the Chamber noted that article 3 of the ICTY Statute, which was 
at the center of the discussion in the Tadić case, “lacks any express reference to the nature of 
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same outcomes as other international crimes (in particular in terms of their 
severity), and the different elements of an existing crime are satisfied, then 
arguably there is no need to treat environmental crimes differently.
No doubt, this argument reflects a “utilitarian anthropocentric approach, 
valuing the environment to the extent it is able to serve the interests of hu-
man beings,” while an ecocentric approach would grant an intrinsic value to 
the environment, irrespective of whether human beings suffer as a result of 
its destruction.
262
Anthropocentrism is open to criticism, and one may argue 
that nature should have its own legal rights.
263
However, for the sake of the 
discussion here, it is perhaps more constructive to focus on a crime’s effects 
on humans since the Rome Statute—and, in particular, the category of
crimes against humanity—seems to reflect more of an anthropocentric ap-
proach.
The link between harm to the environment and harm to human beings is 
well demonstrated in the context of the climate crisis. Climate change “af-
fects the social and environmental determinants of health—clean air, safe 
drinking water, sufficient food and secure shelter,”
264
and therefore, it has 
indisputable implications on the lives, health, and livelihoods of human be-
ings. Climate change is also associated with migration,
265
as well as with na-
tional security issues.
266
The preamble of the Paris Agreement reflects these 
concerns: “[C]limate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversi-
ble threat to human societies and the planet.”
267
the underlying conflict required.” See id. ¶ 71. Therefore, the ability to draw a conclusion 
from this decision to the context of the Rome Statute and its elaborated list of crimes may be 
limited.
262. See Gillett, supra note 254, at 75.
263. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Towards Legal Rights 
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV., 450 (1972); see also PUBLIC RADIO EXCHANGE, Liv-
ing on Earth: The Amazon as Legal Person (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.loe.org/shows/
segments.html?programID=18-P13-00016&segmentID=1 (discussing a 2018 ruling of Co-
lombia’s Supreme Court, granting the river and tropical forest of the Colombian part of the 
Amazon the legal standing of a person, so ‘guardians’ could sue on its behalf for protection).
264. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Climate Change and Health (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health. 
265. See supra Part III.B.2.i.
266. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 3 (2015) (“[C]limate change is an ur-
gent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, 
refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water. These impacts are 
already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are projected to increase 
over time.”); UN Secretary-General, Climate Change and Its Possible Security Implications,
U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009); Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/15 (July 20, 2011); Letter From the Permanent Representative, New 
Zealand, to the Secretary General, United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2015/543 (July 15, 2015).
267. Paris Agreement, supra note 145.
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The connection between environmental degradation and human rights is 
also manifested in the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of article 6 
of the ICCPR. According to the Human Rights Committee’s General Com-
ment 36, “Environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable 
development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the 
ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.”
268
Thus, 
the well-established link between environmental degradation and the threats 
it poses to human societies supports the interpretation of crimes aimed at 
protecting human beings as relevant to environmental crimes as well.
269
In sum, the competing considerations mentioned above may be used to 
support different (and opposing) conclusions, depending on the agenda one 
wishes to promote. Therefore, the question of whether the Rome Statute 
may be read to include environmental crimes seems to be a matter of discre-
tion. Indeed,
the process of establishing the jurisdiction of international courts 
over disputes referred to them inevitably contains strong discretion-
ary features. Through the discretion they exercise at a number of 
critical legal junctures that present themselves in the adjudicative 
procedure, international courts are able to exercise some degree of 
case selection, which tends to be category-based, and not case-
specific.
270
Although this notion pertains to the discretionary power of international 
courts, it may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the interpretive process con-
ducted by the OTP in determining whether a certain case should be investi-
gated and prosecuted. Given that the OTP Policy Paper details the criteria 
for case selection, one may naturally assume that these policy considera-
268. General Comment 36, supra note 124, art. 62; see also Portillo Cáceres v. Para-
guay: Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, Con-
cerning Communication No. 2751/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016, Human 
Rights Comm. (Sept. 20 2019), (expressing the view that environmental degradation consti-
tutes a violation of article 6 and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights—the right to life and the right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
privacy, family, or home, respectively); see also Human Rights Comm., Teitiota v. New Zea-
land: Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Con-
cerning Communication No. 2728/2016, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, ¶ 9.11 (Janu-
ary 7 2020) (expressing the view that “without robust national and international efforts, the 
effects of climate change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their 
rights under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant”).
269. This link may also support the notion of corporate liability, given the “corporate 
duty to respect human rights.” See U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
supra note 49.
270. YUVAL SHANY, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 104 (2016). Additionally, “the most important occasion for the ex-
ercise of judicial discretion in connection with case selection, applied by all international 
courts, involves the interpretation of the judicial provisions governing their operation.” Id. at 
105.
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tions—including the focus on environmental crimes—will be taken into ac-
count by the Prosecutor in the process of determining whether the alleged 
conduct of fossil fuel companies falls within the scope of the Court’s juris-
diction. The Court, however, is obviously not bound by these policy consid-
erations and is free to exercise different ones. Nevertheless, the mere exist-
ence of these explicit policy goals may prompt a discussion with regard to 
environmental crimes and bring them into the spotlight in the adjudicative 
procedure.
This discussion may include, inter alia, the different considerations that 
warrant prosecution before the ICC, rather than resolution through non-
criminal avenues or before national jurisdictions. Indeed, as in many other 
instances, criminal prosecution is not necessarily the only way to achieve 
the goals of justice, deterrence, public condemnation, and utility. Nonethe-
less, the international community has found it important, for various rea-
sons, to establish a permanent international criminal court, so that those who 
commit “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole,” and that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world” will “not go unpunished.”
271
Therefore, one may argue that there is 
no justification for excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court severe and 
irreversible environmental crimes that threaten the peace, security, and well-
being of the world.
Moreover, prosecuting environmental crimes before the ICC—if 
deemed possible—will play an important role in generating deterrence. In 
the case of corporate environmental crimes, not only will it have a profound 
impact on corporate officials, but it will also be a game-changer with regard 
to the corporations themselves; the risk of criminal prosecution and the 
heavy damage it might cause could lead to a deep organizational change at 
the firm level.
Furthermore, in addition to ending impunity and generating deterrence, 
the prosecution of environmental crimes before the ICC will also play a cru-
cial role in promoting the global acceptance of international norms regard-
ing the recognition of environmental crimes, and will also support the de-
velopment of international criminal law.
272
Additionally, “as international 
trials are, by definition, more visible and are often regarded more credible 
than national proceedings, holding trials at the ICC signals the determina-
tion of the international community to stigmatize deviant behavior.”
273
Hence, prosecution before the ICC could convey a loud and clear message 
of condemnation. Finally, due to the fact that the Rome Statute enables the 
participation of victims in the proceedings
274
and sets forth a mechanism for 
271. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
272. See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at 
227–29. 
273. Id. at 236.
274. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 68.
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the reparation to victims,
275
prosecution before the ICC may also serve the 
goal of victim satisfaction.
276
For instance, in the context of the alleged cli-
mate crimes, this may be used to provide financial support to climate miti-
gation and adaptation efforts in communities vulnerable to the adverse ef-
fects of climate change.
True, it may be argued that environmental crimes should be prosecuted 
before national jurisdictions and not necessarily before the ICC. However, 
this argument applies equally to other international crimes, and questions 
regarding the appropriate forum should be resolved in accordance with the 
rules pertaining to the principle of complementarity,
277
which is “part of the 
Court’s DNA” and “represents the express will of States Parties to create an 
institution that is global in scope while recognizing the primary responsibil-
ity of States themselves to exercise criminal jurisdiction.”
278
It is important 
to note that this principle is also reflected in the OTP Policy Paper, which 
explicitly recalls “that the goal of the Statute to combat impunity and pre-
vent the recurrence of violence” is “to be achieved by combining the activi-




The discussion above demonstrates that the question of whether corpo-
rations (or corporate officials) can be prosecuted for climate crimes before 
the ICC is mostly a matter of prosecutorial and judicial discretion. The lan-
guage of the Rome Statute presents several significant hurdles to prosecu-
tion, both in terms of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and its personal 
jurisdiction. However, whereas the explicit wording of article 25(1) will 
probably be more difficult to overcome by purposive interpretation, it seems 
that the language of the core crimes (and, in particular, crimes against hu-
manity) grants more leeway for creative interpretation, thus making the 
question at issue heavily dependent on the willingness of the Prosecutor and 
the Court to go the extra mile and expand the scope of existing international 
crimes to cover new forms of harm.
Given the substantial challenges to prosecution described above, and 
considering that the notion of applying the Rome Statute to the circum-
stances of corporate climate crimes includes a number of “firsts,” perhaps 
the OTP will opt for a one-step-at-a-time approach. For instance, the OTP 
may choose to prosecute corporate executives for alleged crimes, and leave 
the issue of the ICC’s jurisdiction over legal persons for another day. That 
275. Id. art. 75.
276. See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at 
232–33.
277. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. ¶ 10 and arts. 1, 17.
278. See SCHABAS COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 447.
279. See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
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being said, however, it may be that expanding the scope of crimes to include 
crimes against the environment and broadening the category of perpetrators 
to encompass corporations go hand in hand, due to the enormous impact 
multinational corporations have on environmental issues.
This article sought to examine the broad question of holding corpora-
tions criminally accountable for environmental destruction, through the 
prism of climate crimes. It seems that the gravity of climate change, its pro-
found effect on communities, wildlife, and future generations, and its irre-
versible nature, make it a good test case in this context. In particular, the ur-
gency posed by the climate crisis well illustrates the importance of using 
existing tools in order to tackle new threats to the international community 
as a whole.
The need to adapt international law to contemporary challenges and to 
“adjust its norms to new battlefield conditions, as well as to new patterns of 
atrocities conduct”
280
is reflected in the priorities set forth in the OTP Policy 
Paper. Though the practical implications of the Policy Paper still remain to 
be seen, if holding corporations or corporate executives criminally account-
able for environmental crimes at the international level is possible, not only 
will it promote the goals of justice and deterrence, but it will also accelerate 
the development of more robust norms pertaining to corporate accountabil-
ity in international environmental law.
280. See Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 249, at 
229.

